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Abstract
Zhao Liu
TAIWANESE ACCOUNTS OF THE MEANING OF THEIR NATIONAL IDENTITY: 
A QUALITATIVE STUDY
The national identity of Taiwanese people has been a topic under public debate and 
academic inspection since Taiwan’s democratization in the 1980s and the 1990s. In this 
study, I interviewed fifteen Taiwanese students studying in the United States and talked 
with them about their national identity. Interviews with the fifteen students reveal that an 
independent Taiwanese identity has taken shape, while a Chinese cultural identity still 
remains part of the Taiwanese identity. It was also discovered that although a Taiwanese 
national identity has formed, a Taiwanese ethnicity has not yet taken a complete form. 
Discussions with the Taiwanese students also indicate that studying in the multi-cultural 
United States renders them more aware of their Taiwanese national identity, as well as 
their Chinese cultural identity.
Carrie E. Foote, Ph.D., Chair
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Chapter 1. Introduction
Taiwan is one of the places in the world that has frequently undergone sovereignty 
transitions during the last hundred years. Having been under the control of the Chinese 
Qing dynasty since 1684, Taiwan was ceded by China to Japan in 1895, after China was 
defeated by Japan in the Sino-Japanese war (Lamley 2007). Taiwan was under Japanese 
rule from 1895 to 1945. In 1945, the Japanese lost the Pacific War to the Allied Forces, 
consisting of China, the United States, and Great Britain. As part of China’s victory 
package, Japan handed Taiwan back to China in 1945 (Phillips 2007).
When Japan bestowed Taiwan to Chinese control, the regime that governed China 
was the Republic of China (ROC). The government of the ROC was then largely 
controlled by the Chinese Nationalist Party, or Kuomintang. Shortly after the retrocession 
of Taiwan, the ROC entered a civil war with the Chinese communist armed forces. In 
1949, the Chinese Communist Party won the civil war, and created the government of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC), which has been governing China ever since. At the 
same time, the ROC was driven away by the communists and relocated to Taiwan 
(Pepper 1986). The ROC still governs Taiwan today.
Having experienced the rule of three different regimes, the identity of the Taiwanese 
people changed along with the rotation of their governments. Diversity of places of origin 
of current Taiwanese residents makes their identity more complicated. Among 
contemporary Taiwanese residents, some are called Taiwanese Aboriginal Peoples, whose 
ancestors have been living in Taiwan for fifteen thousand years (Stainton 2007). Later 
when shipwright technology allowed it, continental Chinese people sailed overseas and 
occasionally stopped by this island not too far away from the Chinese coast. Some 
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Chinese even moved from the continent to Taiwan. A noticeable wave of immigration 
from the Asian continent to Taiwan started in the Ming dynasty in the 1500s, and moving 
never ceased after that.
The war between the ROC and the Chinese Communist Party resulted in 40 years of 
separation between China and Taiwan. Both governments denied the legitimacy of each 
other, and claimed the sovereignty of the land controlled by the opposite party. China-
Taiwan communication stopped for four decades until 1987, when travel restrictions were 
lifted. Since then, economic and cultural exchange has been revived between the two 
countries.
Although Taiwan is now a de facto independent country with its own government, 
Taiwanese people’s identity is not yet entirely Taiwanese. The generation who were 
educated under Japanese rule still have memories of their life under Japanese control 
(Ching 2001). Those who came to Taiwan from China with the Kuomintang in the late 
1940s still remember their Chinese hometowns and see themselves as Chinese (Hughes 
1997). Young people who were born after the 1980s interpret their country in a way 
different from both their parents and grandparents. There are plenty of scholarly papers 
and books on the identity of Taiwanese people as a whole. However, not so many studies 
focus on young Taiwanese people. At the same time, most of the studies on Taiwanese 
identity were conducted in Taiwan. My thesis aims to explore how young people from 
Taiwan see themselves in terms of national identity, and how living in another country 
affects their self-perception on their country of origin.
In this thesis, as geographical and political terms, I will use Taiwan to refer to the 
country that is represented by the government of the Republic of China, and China as the 
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name of the country represented by the government of the People’s Republic of China. 
The acronym of the Republic of China is ROC, and the acronym of the People’s Republic 
of China is PRC. In the historical period relevant to my study, the ROC had been 
controlled by the Chinese Nationalist Party, or the Kuomintang. The PRC has always 
been controlled by the Chinese Communist Party, abbreviated as CCP. At the same time, 
interviewees might use different names to refer to Taiwan and China in the interviews. 
For example, some of them use “mainland China” to refer to the PRC-controlled area. In 
this case, the original wording is kept, whatever they use to indicate the two countries.
Geographically, the ROC rules the Penghu Islands, the Kinmen Islands, and the 
Matsu Islands. But because none of my participants was from those areas, the three island 
groups were excluded from this study. Likewise, Hong Kong and Macau are nominally 
(and also practically, to some extent) under the PRC’s control. However, because 
societies, histories and cultures in Hong Kong and Macau substantially differ from those 
of other parts of China, they are also excluded from the scope of analysis.
The thesis employs many names that were originally in the Chinese language. A 
glossary can be found at the end of the thesis to explain how those Chinese names were 
transliterated.
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Chapter 2. Literature Review
In this part, I will outline separately the history of Taiwan as a geographical entity, 
and the history of the ROC as a political entity. Because the PRC claims Taiwan’s 
sovereignty since its establishment in 1949, I will document how the PRC asserts its 
claim. After historical review, I will paraphrase Anthony Smith’s theory on national 
identity and ethnicity as the theoretical reference of my thesis. At the end of the literature 
review, I talk about several existing studies on Taiwanese identity.
1. History of Taiwan
(Photo 1)
Taiwan is located to the southeast of continental China, to the north of the 
Philippines, and to the southwest of Japan. Scholars have substantial disagreement on the 
origin of aboriginal Taiwanese people living on this island. Some generally accepted 
points are the following: There are today at least 500,000 people in Taiwan, out of a total 
population of 23 million (2%) who are now officially called “Taiwan Aboriginal 
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Peoples” (yuan zhu min). They speak Austronesian languages. Their cultures and physical 
attributes identify them as Austronesian peoples. They have been living in Taiwan for at 
least fifteen thousand years (Stainton 2007). There are three major schools that attempt to 
explain the origin of aboriginal Taiwanese. One theory contends that aboriginal 
Taiwanese, who spoke the Austronesian language, traveled northward from Southeast 
Asia through the Indonesian and Philippine archipelagos, ultimately reaching Taiwan. 
Scholars who embrace this theory include the Dutch Indologist Hendrik Kern, who is the 
first proposer of the southern origin theory, and the Canadian missionary, George Leslie 
Mackay, who independently came to the same conclusion as Kern. Japanese 
anthropologists continued the tradition of southern origin, and based on their research 
about Taiwan Aboriginal People on the idea that they came from the south. The southern 
origin theory is promoted in situations where an ethnic and political border is drawn 
between Taiwan and China, specifically between Taiwan Aboriginal Peoples as non-
Chinese and the Chinese in Taiwan (Stainton 2007).
Another theory contends that Taiwan Aboriginal Peoples came from the north, or to 
be exact, from continental Asia. The first Chinese anthropologist who studied Taiwan, Lin 
Huixiang, initially accepted the southern origin theory in his report about his first visit to 
Taiwan in 1929. However, he noticed the similarity between Taiwan and Shaanxi adzes, 
and tentatively hypothesized “some relationship” between Taiwan Aboriginal Peoples and 
the Han people on the continent. It is notable that Lin Huixiang was mainly a scholar, and 
at the time of his research (1929), Japan and China were not at war. He was working from 
his data and not from a “Chinese” nationalist program. The possibility raised by Lin was 
afterwards seriously pursued by linguist Robert Blust and later, more Chinese scholars 
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focused their research on the northern origin theory. This theory serves the needs of the 
Chinese nationalist “histories,” that of the PRC and that of the ROC (Stainton 2007). 
The third theory was proposed in 1963 by Isidore Dyen, maintaining that Taiwan had 
more than twenty languages of Austronesian origin, thus Taiwan was highly likely to be 
the place of origin of the Austronesian language family. Essentially, this theory is a 
refinement of the northern origin theory, positing an early Neolithic immigration from 
southeastern continental Asia, and then independent development in Taiwan. As an 
antithesis to the Republic of China’s Chinese claim on Taiwan, this theory gained rapid 
circulation among Taiwan Aboriginal Peoples in the Lee Teng-hui era of democracy and 
political transformation, and was utilized by the Taiwan Aboriginal Peoples to strive for 
rights that they claimed were restricted by the Republic of China. Besides, it is not solely 
an aboriginal discourse but also a Taiwanese nationalist discourse. Appearing in the 
1990s, it became a Taiwanese nationalist ideology, as opposed to the claim made by both 
the PRC and the ROC that Taiwan was essentially Chinese (Stainton 2007).
Documented Taiwan-China relations started in the late Ming dynasty (1500s), when 
shipwright technology advanced and overseas business flourished. It is mainly the 
adventurous Fujian people who traveled across the ocean to conduct business with 
Japanese, and they occasionally landed on Taiwan for supplies. Over time, more and 
more people of Fujian ancestry settled in Taiwan and established families (Vermeer 
2007). 
The Dutch made their first appearance in the Penghu Islands as early as 1604. In the 
1630s, they built Casteel Zeelandia in today’s Anping District of Tainan, and Fort 
Provintia on the west coast of the now Tainan city. They used Taiwan as a springboard in 
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their business venture into the continent. They treated Taiwan as a layover place where 
they could negotiate with imperial Ming China for trade and business opportunities. The 
same is true for the Spanish, who arrived in Keelung and Tam-sui in the 1620s. But in the 
first half of the 1600s, the Ming dynasty was wrestling with a series of internal problems 
and took little interest in foreign trade. Thus a Fujian native, Cheng Chih-lung, was 
appointed to act as the Chinese representative and negotiated with the European visitors 
(Wills Jr 2007). 
In the 1660s, the Ming dynasty was about to collapse and give way to the Qing 
dynasty. Loyal to the Ming dynasty, Koxinga, or Cheng Ch’eng-kung, son of 
aformentioned Cheng Chih-lung, decided to flee his business base in Fujian, and he sailed 
over to Taiwan with his powerful fleet. He drove away the Dutch and the Spanish, and set 
up the Cheng regime in Taiwan in 1661 (Wills Jr 2007).
On the Chinese mainland, the Qing dynasty defeated the Ming and took control of the 
whole country in the 1660s. The Qing dynasty must have felt nervous knowing that a 
regime maintaining loyalty to the preceding Ming dynasty still existed in Taiwan, thus it 
wanted to dispose of the Cheng regime. In 1683, after a series of of threats and 
negotiations, Shi Lang, a Chinese official, entered Taiwan and accepted the submission of 
the Cheng regime, on behalf of the Qing dynasty (Wills Jr 2007). 
The Qing dynasty had few ideas about what to do with Taiwan. The empire’s attitude 
towards Taiwan was quite negative and minimalist. It was merely interested in keeping it 
out of the hands of the “trouble-making” foreigners and dissident Chinese (Wills Jr 
2007). Initially the imperial court planned to evacuate all Chinese from Taiwan in order 
to avoid Taiwan being a refuge of chaos and revolutions. It ordered all Chinese without 
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families or land in Taiwan to return to the continent. Those with wives and property, and 
desiring to remain, were required to register with local officials. As a result, half of the 
Chinese population departed the island by the ninth month of 1684, according to Shi 
Lang’s estimates. Thanks to Shi Lang’s vigorous argument in favor of incorporating the 
island into the empire, evacuation was dropped. Taiwan was made a prefecture of the 
Fujian province in 1684. However, immigration from the mainland to Taiwan was 
regulated, preventing the migration of families. Export of rice from the mainland to 
Taiwan was prohibited (Shepherd 2007).
The Qing rule on Taiwan was quite fragile. The court’s restriction on migration of 
families aimed to prevent Taiwan from becoming a refuge for dissidents. Ironically, it is 
just because only single males came to Taiwan that the society in Taiwan was volatile. 
Several rebellions, including the Zhu Yigui Chinese rebellion in 1721 and the Wu 
Fusheng aboriginal revolts of 1731-32, may have stimulated the Qing court to reconsider 
its Taiwan policy (Shepherd 2007). The appearance of European traders, Christian 
missionaries, and diplomatic missions may also have inspired the court to consider 
Taiwan’s important economic and strategic position. In 1885, the Qing court declared 
Taiwan a province of the empire (Gardella 2007). 
However, the Qing dynasty did not have too much time to build Taiwan, because it 
had to cede Taiwan to Japan at the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War in 1895 (Lamley 
2007). Over all, the Japanese treated Taiwan with an assimilationist policy, by teaching 
the Japanese language and prescribing Japanese social norms. Japanese rule was a 
double-edged sword to Taiwan. On one hand, Taiwan underwent modernization under the 
Japanese regime, mainly in sanitation and education. The Japanese unified measurements 
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and currency, created postal, banking and telegraph systems, built infrastructure including 
harbors, railroads, and power plants, and developed industry in areas such as sugar, 
aluminum, cement, iron, chemicals, textiles and lumber. On the other hand, the 
Taiwanese suffered in terms of political rights and government participation (Phillips 
2007). 
Taiwan was “restored” by Japan to the Republic of China in 1945 at the end of World 
War II. The China Nationalist Party (the Kuomintang, or the KMT) sent officials to 
Taiwan to execute sovereignty takeover. The people who came to Taiwan from mainland 
China during and after this period are called Mainlanders (waisheng ren). Those who had 
already been living in Taiwan prior to 1945 are called Islanders (bensheng ren). The 
arrival of mainlander officials aroused mixed feelings among the islanders. In 1947, the 
February 28 incident broke out, bringing an estimated casualty figure of 10,000. After the 
incident, the Kuomintang government assumed control over every aspect of Taiwanese 
society, culminating with the imposition of martial law in 1949 (Phillips 2007). In the 
same year, the Nationalist Party realized that they would lose the Chinese civil war to the 
Chinese Communist Party and retreated to Taiwan from mainland China. The ROC and 
the Taiwan province have overlapped ever since (Wang 2007). (Besides Taiwan, the 
Republic of China also ruled the Penghu Islands, the Kinmen Islands and the Matsu 
Islands.)
2. History of the Republic of China
The Republic of China was inaugurated in 1911 in Nanjing, with Dr. Sun Yat-sen as 
the provisional president. Shortly after its foundation, the political center of the ROC was 
moved to Beijing (Young 1983). The establishment of the ROC did not bring national 
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unity. Different parts of China were controlled separately by local warlords, and they did 
not always comply with the central government (Sheridan 1983). In order to unify China, 
the Nationalist Revolution was planned in 1923, under the leadership of the Nationalist 
Party, or the Kuomintang. It took the Kuomintang and its allies five years to put the 
whole of China under the nominal control of a single central government. As the 
commander-in-chief of the Nationalist Revolution Army, Chiang Kai-shek played the 
most important role both in the military advancement of the frontline and in the 
diplomatic negotiation with local warlords. In 1927, Chiang Kai-shek and his 
Kuomintang allies declared Nanjing as the capital of the ROC. One year after that, the 
whole of China was unified (Wilbur 1983). 
During the Nanjing decade, from 1928 to 1938, there was noticeable social and 
economic development. Ordinary people were generally optimistic about the future of the 
new China. In adverse situations, the Republic of China maintained territorial integrity, 
boosted their national economy and increased tax revenues. The Nanjing government also 
set up diplomatic relations with major countries in the world, the most important being 
the United States (Eastman 1986a). The golden decade of the Nanjing government 
terminated with the breakout of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937. The attack of the 
Japanese was so menacing that the government of the Republic of China had to relocate 
to the hinterland starting from 1938, along with ordinary people, factory workers, 
universities, among others. The Republic of China suffered tremendous economic loss in 
the war with Japan. In 1945, Japan surrendered to the Allies. The capital of the Republic 
of China returned to Nanjing (Eastman 1986b). 
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Peace did not last long after the Sino-Japanese war, for the Chinese communists still 
controlled a great portion of China. Intending to continue their separatist occupation, the 
communists were not willing to cooperate with the Nanjing government. Chinese 
communists came into existence during the Nationalist Revolution in the 1920s. 
Supported by the Soviet Union, they were integrated into the Kuomintang, and were 
supposed to make contributions to the unity of China at that time. In fact, they were more 
interested in territorial control in their own zone than in the immediate unity of the whole 
country. In 1927, when the communists estimated that their power was equal to the 
government force, they made their rebellion public in Nanchang (Wilbur 1983). 
Attracting the attention of the Republic of China, their rebellion was suppressed. Thus the 
communist movement went underground.
The tension between China and Japan might have provided the communists with 
another opportunity to gain publicity. After several years of illegal status, the Communist 
Party made a statement that they wanted to form a “united front” with the Kuomintang 
(Slyke 1986). Chiang Kai-shek, having been kidnapped by his pro-communist general, 
had to agree to the communists’ involvement in the combat against the Japanese 
(Eastman 1986b). While the Kuomintang force was seriously involved in the defense of 
China against the Japanese, the communists took advantage of the chaos. They benefited 
greatly from the war by occupying land, embezzling ammunition, and even directly 
confronting the Kuomintang army. At the end of the war, the ROC was exhausted, and the 
Communist Party had greatly developed itself (Slyke 1986). The consequence was fatal 
for the Kuomintang. They lost the civil war to the Communist Party. After negotiations 
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between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party failed, the Kuomintang and its 
government of the ROC retreated to Taiwan in 1949 (Pepper 1986).
With Taiwan being the only landmass over which the Kuomintang took actual 
control, Chiang Kai-shek imposed severe restrictions on civil society to ensure his 
foothold. He began the “White Terror” or the Martial Law period lasting from 1949 to 
1987. During this period, the Kuomintang government controlled almost all social 
spheres. The Taiwanese nationalist movement was prohibited, for the Kuomintang 
promoted a Chinese nationalist ideology in Taiwan and claimed Taiwan was Chinese 
(Phillips 2007). But the Chinese nationalist ideology was undermined in 1971, when the 
United Nations (United Nations 1971) recognized the People’s Republic of China as the 
legitimate representative of China. After that, the Taiwanese independence movement and 
aboriginal movement started to flourish, despite the Kuomintang’s suppression of the 
notion of an independent Taiwan, and its continued Chinese claim on Taiwan (Rubinstein 
2007). 
The Mei-li-tao incident in 1979 was the climax of confrontations between the 
Kuomintang and the Taiwanese nationalistic movements. In the subsequent 1980s, 
economic development, the rise of the middle class and the increasing awareness of 
democracy in Taiwanese society pushed the Nationalist Party to reconsider its Martial 
Law policy. In 1986, victims and sympathizers of the Mei-li-tao incident declared the 
establishment of the Democratic Progressive Party, in defiance of the Martial Law 
restriction on political parties. In the same year, President Chiang Ching-kuo repealed the 
Martial Law. In 1996, the Republic of China in Taiwan held the first direct presidential 
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election. This was seen by many as a watershed event, marking the considerable success 
of the island’s democratization during the post-war era (Clark 2007). 
3. The PRC’s Claim to Taiwan
The Civil War between the government of the ROC and the Chinese Communist 
Party started in 1946 (Pepper 1986) and did not end until 1950 (Clough 1991). While the 
war was still on-going, Mao Zedong announced the establishment of the PRC in October 
1949 (Teiwes 1987). Since the PRC government was solely dominated by the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP), it continued the antagonism featured in the relation between the 
CCP and the ROC. Belligerence between the PRC and the ROC did not end with the 
Kuomintang’s retreat to Taiwan. Besides, the PRC claims Taiwan as one of its provinces. 
The communists’ claim on Taiwan is based on two assumptions. First, the PRC considers 
that Taiwan has “been China’s territory from ancient times” (in the words of Zhou Enlai, 
then Premier of the PRC). Second, the PRC holds itself as the only legitimate government 
of China. As a result, Despite the fact that “neither Taiwan nor the islands of Kinmen and 
Matsu have ever been under the authority of the Chinese Communists” (in the words of 
then Secretary of State John Foster Dulles) (Chai 1999), the People’s Republic of China 
maintained that Taiwan belonged to it, indicating a complete disavowal of the 
government of the Republic of China. Likewise, the ROC did not abandon their mainland 
ambition, either. Chiang Kai-shek’s main aim in retreating to Taiwan was to buy time to 
organize a counter-offensive against the Communists. Mainland China’s recovery was his 
major goal, and it provided the foundation for many of his policies in Taiwan. For 
example, in 1960 he addressed the National Assembly in Taipei, saying that “the recovery 
of the mainland and the deliverance of our compatriots there from the Communist 
13
tyranny are the sacred missions from which we are morally bound never to fall 
back” (Chai 1999). It is notable that both the PRC and the ROC agreed on the so-called 
one-China policy, both maintaining mainland China and Taiwan should be under one 
Chinese government, with the PRC and the ROC seeing the one government as itself, 
respectively.
The breakout of the Korean War in 1950 alerted the United States to the importance 
of Taiwan as a foothold to prevent communist expansion. Thus from that time, the United 
States resolved to assist Chiang Kai-shek’s Republic of China to forestall communist 
occupation of the island. In the 1950s, two crises occurred. The first crisis happened in 
the mid 1950s, when the Yijiangshan Islands and the Dachen Islands off the Zhejiang 
coast were captured by the PRC. The second crisis was in 1958, when the PRC launched 
a massive bombardment on the ROC-controlled offshore island of Kinmen. The crisis did 
not escalate, despite the lack of any formal treaties between the ROC, the PRC, and the 
US. Later, the attack took the form of a token bombardment on odd days of the month 
only, to showcase Mao’s military capacity and determination over the island and the ROC 
government (Clough 1991). After that, military action gradually decreased, finally 
ceasing in 1979.
In 1971, the PRC replaced the ROC in the United Nations, becoming the only 
legitimate representative of China recognized by the international community (United 
Nations 1971). With the death of Mao in 1976, the PRC’s political fanaticism started to 
fade somewhat. Post-Mao leaders were more practical in their handling of Taiwan. In 
1991, the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARSTS) was founded. It is 
14
a PRC-organized non-government organization, and it acts as the point of correspondence 
with authorities in Taiwan. 
Almost at the same time, with the lifting of Taiwan’s Martial Law, President Chiang 
Ching-kuo started to allow Taiwanese visits to mainland China in the 1980s. In 1990, the 
Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) was established by the ROC government. Like its 
counterpart in China, this foundation is under the control of the Mainland Affairs Council 
of the Executive Yuan of the ROC. The establishment of the two quasi-governmental 
organizations paved the way for cross-strait talks. In 1992, the heads of the ARSTS and 
the SEF met in Hong Kong and reached an agreement, which is called the 1992 
Consensus. Under the 1992 Consensus, both the ROC and the PRC agreed that there is 
only one China, and mainland China and Taiwan should be under one government of 
China, leaving the question of what this China is up to the two governments’ separate 
(and contradictory) interpretations (Xu 2001). 
But the PRC never gave up on Taiwan. During the last two decades of the twentieth 
century, the PRC government came up with a model which is known as “one country, two 
systems.” If Taiwan was merged with the PRC, Taiwan would be considered as a local 
government under Beijing’s command, like Hong Kong and Macau, but it would enjoy a 
high degree of autonomy, according to the PRC’s explanation of this policy. To force 
Taipei into a PRC-dominated deal, Beijing has isolated Taiwan internationally, backing 
up its claim with the threat of military force. In 1995, President Lee Teng-hui of the ROC 
visited Cornell University, his alma mater, and gave a speech. Beijing interpreted Lee’s 
visit as an attempt to create “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan.” The PRC 
conducted military exercises and missile tests in the waters close to Taiwan (Wang and 
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Liu 2004). In 2000, President Chen Shui-bian came to office. As the first president of the 
oldest opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party, Chen tried to alleviate the 
tension between China and Taiwan. However, his friendly signals were met with disdain 
or even antagonism by Beijing, which considered Chen’s support of the “one-China 
principle” to be insincere and ambiguous (Hickey and Li 2002). Later in 2008, Chen 
pushed for a national referendum on whether Taiwan should apply for membership in the 
United Nations. The referendum failed due to an insufficient turnout rate. But the 
referendum was successful in promoting Taiwan’s national awareness and its agenda to 
acquire de jure independence (Chu 2008).
President Ma Ying-jeou was elected in 2008. With his second term starting in 2012, 
he is expected to remain in office until 2016. His policy with regard to mainland China is 
“no unification, no independence, and no use of force.” He improved ROC-PRC relations 
after he took power, mainly in the aspects of the economy, direct transportation, and 
postal service. He also invited Beijing officials to visit Taiwan, which invoked criticisms 
that he was downplaying Taiwan’s status as an independent country. Beijing was pleased 
by Ma’s attitude to maintain the status quo, and the absence of his provocative action 
against the PRC (Gold 2009). He was still president when this thesis was being written. 
Likewise, while the PRC claims sovereignty over Taiwan, the ROC also claims 
sovereignty over mainland China. The ROC’s mainland policy ran from President Chiang 
Kai-shek’s time, when he swore to fight against the mainland regime and to purge the 
Communists. The ROC’s claim on mainland China has not substantially changed over the 
last several decades. As late as 2012, the ROC still claims that mainland China is under 
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its sovereignty, while recognizing that it has difficulty exerting actual administrative 
control over it (Mainland Affairs Council 2012). The PRC’s and the ROC’s mutual claims 
on each other’s territory, and their mutual refusals to formally recognize each other’s 
legitimacy are major factors blurring the national identity of people who live in Taiwan.
4. National Identity
Different scholars have different ideas about the definition of a “nation”. In this study, 
the definition offered by Anthony Smith is adopted. According to Smith, a nation is a 
named human population sharing five characteristics. Analytically, a nation consists of 
[1] a historic territory, or homeland, [2] common myths and historical memories, [3] a 
common, mass public culture, [4] common legal rights and duties for all members, [5] a 
common economy with territorial mobility for members. Respectively, national identity is 
made up of five components: [1] land, [2] history, which refers to a common past which 
people identify as the story of their ancestors, or one ethnic group, [3] culture, which 
refers to the contemporary culture which members of a nation experience, [4] a unique 
political power, and [5] a shared economy (Smith 1991).  
Another concept which is closely related to nation is ethnicity. Also according to 
Smith, ethnicity is a multi-faceted concept that includes a collective proper name, a myth 
of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more differentiating elements of 
common culture, an association with a specific “homeland,” and a sense of solidarity for 
significant sectors of the population. By definition, an ethnicity appears quite similar to a 
nation. But a closer examination between the two terms reveals that an important 
difference between a nation and an ethnicity is political power. Clearly, an ethnicity does 
not denote the power, rights, and duties shared by its members. Conversely, a nation 
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includes power relations among its members as a defining trait. Sometimes, political 
power is actually the core concept of a nation, for the political leaders of a population 
mobilize the people to form a new nation-state out of a colonial power, or utilize the 
concept of a nation to maintain the political power they have already attained.
Although many ethnic groups have a long history, it should be clarified that an 
ethnicity is not always primordial. With the transformation of geo-political situation, a 
new ethnicity might well possibly emerge. An existing ethnicity can also be merged with 
another ethnicity, or simply become extinguished in extreme conditions such as genocide. 
As for the relationship between ethnicity and nation, it is recognized that many nations 
are formed on the basis of ethnic cores, and there indeed is considerable historical and 
conceptual overlap between ethnicities and nations. Notwithstanding, as I have said 
before, the difference between an ethnicity and a nation is a well-defined power relation. 
Not all ethnicities possess or evolve common legal codes, thus not all ethnicities become 
nations. Conversely, a nation can be formed out of several different ethnic groups, or out 
of a separated part of an ethnic group, thus not all nations are products of one 
independent ethnicity. That is to say, an ethnicity is neither a necessary condition nor a 
sufficient premise for the formation of a nation.
5. National Identity of Taiwanese
Currently, there are mainly two national identities in Taiwan: Taiwanese identity and 
Chinese identity. Some scholars have pointed out that these two national identities are 
mutually compatible, but sometimes work in opposite directions among Taiwanese, 
especially in their sense of political identity. They used the idea of “double identity” to 
tackle the problem, identifying many Taiwanese as both Taiwanese and Chinese (Huang, 
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Liu, and Chang 2004). However, from the title of their article (‘The Double Identity of 
Taiwanese Chinese: A Dilemma of Politics and Culture Rooted in History), their point of 
view may be prejudiced in the way that they prematurely assume that in general the 
Taiwanese are Chinese, which is an idea not held by some Taiwanese (Xue, Dai, and 
Chow 2005).
 Wong and Sun (1998) have identified five political positions about Taiwanese’s 
national identity on a continuum. The continuum of national identity held by Taiwanese is 
shown in the following schema:
(Chart 2)
Of the continuum’s poles, one represents a strong Chinese identity, and the other 
represents a strong Taiwanese identity. There are three middle positions between the two 
polar viewpoints, making up five categorized identities. They are: [1] Chinese 
nationalism, which ascertains that Taiwanese are Chinese and Taiwan is part of China; [2] 
Status-quoism, which prefers to keep the status quo of Taiwan; [3] Confused identity, 
which does not have a clear identity in mind; [4] Taiwan-prioritism, which shows a slight 
preference to Taiwanese identity but does not deny the Chinese nature of Taiwanese; [5] 
Taiwanese nationalism, which advocates that Taiwan has nothing to do with China, and 
Taiwan should actively seek acceptance of the global community. Wong and Sun (1998) 
found that Taiwanese were distributed on the five points of the continuum, instead of just 
either identifying with China or identifying with Taiwan. They also found out that the 
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positions which Taiwanese applied to themselves were intertwined, reflecting different 
aspects of their national identity.
The study by Wong and Sun (1998) provides a helpful insight about how to 
conceptualize the topic. The framework of identity they established in their research will 
be considered in this study. At the same time, it is noticed that their research is a political 
position analysis based on a survey that drew many responses, but from close-ended 
questionnaires. Hence, a key limitation of their study is that they did not conduct 
interviews in a way that allowed the Taiwanese to explain, in their own words, what it 
means to be Taiwanese. As such, the critical perspectives of the participants’ own 
meanings about national identity have yet to be fully explored. 
Another limitation of such studies, that my thesis attempts to overcome, is that such 
studies mainly tackle the problem of national identity of Taiwanese on a macro level. 
Quantitative methods have been applied to produce a demographic image of Taiwanese 
national identity. However, a macro-level study is limited in that it does not take into 
account the meaning that the Taiwanese people themselves attribute to their national 
identity in a variety of contexts. This latter understanding requires using a method that 
allows the individuals involved to share their thoughts on national identity, which can 
then produce more detailed and vivid first-person accounts.
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Chapter 3. Methodology
1. Overview
This research used a phenomenological qualitative research design (Esterberg 2002; 
Merriam 2002; Smith and Osborne 2003). The main goal of phenomenological research 
is to uncover the meaning of a phenomenon, such as an emerging national identity, from 
the perspective of those who are experiencing the phenomenon. In doing so, the 
researcher makes an extra effort to “bracket and set aside” his or her own understanding 
of the phenomenon (Merriam 2002; Smith and Osborn 2003). The existing literature 
shows that national identity is a concept that has multiple aspects, thus is difficult to 
define (Smith 1991). This is especially true for newly emergent and understudied national 
identities as in the Taiwanese case. Given this, a qualitative approach that seeks to 
identify the meaning of the phenomena of an emerging national Taiwanese identity is 
appropriate for this study.The research does not attempt to generate a general image of 
Taiwanese’s national identity, nor to produce a complete taxonomy of all possible kinds 
of national identity held by Taiwanese, but rather seeks to provide a rich description of 
the meaning of national identity from the perspective of Taiwanese themselves.
 This research, accordingly, used in-depth interviews to explore the topic of the 
meaning of a Taiwanese national identity. In-depth interviews were ideal for the present 
study because they allowed the participants to share the meaning of a phenomenon in 
their own words (Kvale 2007). National identity is not just an objective category but also 
an internalized value; that is, the people themselves who are directly affected by the 
meanings of this identity (Taiwanese citizens, in this case) may have an understanding of 
the meaning of such identity that differs from the objective definition. In fact this 
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subjective meaning is rarely explored. People may demonstrate their national identity 
externally, such as in an award ceremony of an international game, or when waiting in 
line in front of a passport control point, but clarifying the internal property (i.e., what 
identity means to the individual themselves) of national identity can be done through 
direct conversations with the individuals concerned in open-ended in-depth interviews.
The research method of the thesis study, i.e. interview, is approved by the IRB of 
Indiana University on September 10, 2012, with the approval number 1209009461.
2. Researcher Role
In qualitative methods, the researcher closely interacts with the research participants. 
Data collected are subject to investigators’ inspection, interpretation and selection, thus 
are vulnerable to the person’s prejudice or bias. For this reason, it is necessary for 
qualitative study conductors to reflect on their own thinking, and address appropriately 
the possible effect that a researcher’s view point may exert on the collection of data, the 
presentation of findings and the conclusion (Smith and Osborne 2003).
I was born and grew up in China. The government that ruled China when I was in 
high school was the PRC. The PRC publicized in its education system the notion that 
Taiwan was one of its provinces. Seeing the inconsistency between what I was taught at 
school and what I heard from my Taiwanese friends, I became curious about how people 
from Taiwan perceived their identity. However, both my Taiwanese friends and I avoided 
talking about their identity, thus we never discussed the issue in-depth. Writing my 
master thesis provided an opportunity to satisfy my curiosity about the issue of interest, 
thus I decided to explore Taiwanese identity as the topic of the thesis. Another factor that 
encouraged me to study this topic is language convenience. My native language is 
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Chinese, a language widely spoken in Taiwan. Using the same language as the 
interviewees had grown up with provided a platform for easy communication with my 
interviewees, especially about complicated topics such as identity issues.
A challenge that occurred due to my background of growing up in China was the 
concern that my Taiwanese interviewees might not have felt entirely comfortable talking 
with me about their identity, given the political history between the two countries. 
Fortunately, my anxiety proved to be unfounded when I realized that all the Taiwanese 
interviewees were quite open about different political viewpoints, if they were discussed 
on a mutually respectful basis.
In the analysis below, different points of view are presented proportionately to the 
number of quotes that reflect the respective viewpoints. I tried to ensure that the 
discussion and conclusion are based on the findings from the interviews, and sought to 
avoid any impact from my personal background and viewpoints.
3. Sample and Recruitment
I interviewed a total of 18 Taiwanese citizens. Among the 18 interviewees, one was 
born and grew up in Japan, and she was not a student. Another two interviewees were 
born and largely grew up in the United States, and they held dual citizenship of the 
United States and the ROC. It was found that the three interviewees’ national identities 
were substantially different from those of the remaining 15 interviewees, who were born 
and raised in Taiwan. Most importantly, the topic of a “Taiwanese identity” did not 
appear salient to them. For example, a girl with US and Taiwan dual citizenship answered 
my question:
Interviewer: So, compared to your Taiwanese friends, you do not care so 
much about the Taiwan-China relation?
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Interviewee: I guess so. I only feel a little uncomfortable toward China, 
but I don’t know why I feel so. 1
The other two interviewees expressed similar feelings. Thus only interviewees who 
were born and raised in Taiwan were included in my analysis. 
My sample consists of the remaining 15 Taiwanese students who attended college at 
Indiana University - Purdue University at Indianapolis (IUPUI), on a commuter campus 
in a large city in the Midwestern United States. I interviewed students because they are 
regularly on campus, thus I have easier access to them. Another reason to interview 
students is that they had been in the United States for a relatively short period of time, 
and they were intellectually active. As a result, they were knowledgeable about the issue 
of Taiwanese national identity. Other Taiwanese populations, such as long-term residents 
in the US, surely have their own understanding of national identity, too. But since they 
had been living here for a long time, their identity may not be so Taiwanese as that of 
students.
Initially I planned to interview 12 to 18 Taiwanese students. The determination of the 
planned size of the sample was a comprehensive consideration of data richness, 
compensation payment ability and the size of the Taiwanese student population on 
campus. Obviously, it would be difficult to find any pattern if there were not enough 
interviewees. Thus it would be ideal to find as many participants as possible. However, 
although each additional interviewee could bring his/her unique angle to my study, the 
number of interviewees was subject to my ability to pay them compensation, and the time 
constraints to finishing my thesis. The third factor is the number of Taiwanese students on 
campus. I learned from the school’s Office of International Affairs that there were less 
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than fifty Taiwanese students enrolled at the time of this study. Thus 12 to 18 is a 
reasonable number that I could possibly achieve.
Interviewees had to be at least eighteen years old and born, raised, and educated -- at 
least until some years in high school -- in Taiwan. For recruitment of interviewees, first I 
used snowball sampling. Snowball sampling consists of identifying respondents who are 
then used to refer researchers on to other respondents (Atkinson and Flint 2001). The first 
four interviews were completed as a pilot study for a course, with interviewees selected 
through my personal network. The very first interview was with one of my Taiwanese 
friends who attended a class with me. Then I asked her to recommend another participant. 
I gave her several copies of the flyer of my study, and asked her to forward the flyer along 
with my email address to acquaintances she thought might have interest in an interview. 
By that method, I received emails from my prospective participants and established 
communication with the three additional interviewees. The first four interviews were 
conducted before I received a Department Thesis Grant to compensate interviewees, thus 
these four interviewees chose to participate without the motivation of compensation.
Second, I used my flyer to recruit interviewees after the personal networks of 
interviewees had been exhausted. Flyers were posted throughout the campus. (See 
Appendix 4). Additionally, I turned to the Office of International Affairs of my university 
for help. One of the staff members distributed my flyer to all Taiwanese students enrolled 
on the campus.
4. Interview Process
All interviews were held on campus, and completed in 2012. Interviews were 
recorded with my phone and then transcribed verbatim. Among the fifteen analyzed 
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interviews, the longest lasted 1 hour and 31 minutes, the shortest 29 minutes, with an 
average length of 43 minutes. As said, the first four interviewees were conducted before 
the approval of my thesis grant. All other interviewees received twenty dollars in cash as 
compensation for their time, sponsored by the Department Thesis Grant of the 
Department of Sociology, IUPUI. Additionally, some of the interviewees received a small 
gift, either a keychain or a car sticker, presented after the interview had finished.
I used an interview guide to conduct my interviews. That is to say, all interviewees 
were for the most part asked the same questions. The interview started with some general 
demographic questions, and proceeded to more open-ended questions about self-identity. 
These main questions were followed by probes to elicit detail-rich descriptions. These 
questions covered topics such as family background of the interviewee, his/her viewpoint 
of Taiwan’s status, his/her perception of China as the biggest neighbor, and most 
important, his/her national identity. For the interview guide, see Appendix 1.
Since both the Taiwanese students and I had native fluency in the Chinese language, it 
seemed expedient to conduct the interviews in that tongue. But I used the English 
language in the first few interviews, because I knew my thesis would be written in 
English. However, as the interviews proceeded, I found out that my Taiwanese 
interviewees preferred speaking Chinese, so the rest of interviews were conducted in 
Chinese. It turned out that the interviews in the Chinese language were more enjoyable, 
and produced more nuances than the English interviews. In the data-reporting section, in 
the case of quotes used from Chinese language interviews, I translated them into English. 
The original quotes in the Chinese language are provided in the Quotes in Chinese 
section located at the end of the thesis.
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5. Data Analysis
A total of 15 audio-recorded interviews were transcribed, and the fifteen transcripts 
are the raw data of the study.
Data analysis consisted of three steps using methods from grounded theory (Charmaz 
2003) and phenomenological analysis (Smith 2003). First I performed line-by-line coding 
for the first few interviews. Each line of transcripts was interpreted independently, and 
from each line of the conversation, a code is identified. Such a code is put beside each 
line, as the product of the first step of analysis. Then I performed secondary coding, also 
known as focused coding, or thematic coding. With the help of the codes identified in the 
first-step analysis, each paragraph, or sometimes more than one paragraph, was then 
summarized and designated with a more general theme. The last step of coding involved 
taking a wider look at all themes produced in the secondary coding, and identifying those 
themes which appeared more frequently than others. With these common themes, a memo 
about one certain theme was written. Memos described the themes in detail and included 
quotes. Finally, memos were integrated into this thesis as the data-reporting section.
Throughout the coding process, important themes emerged. Topics that drew my 
attention included: [1] whether Taiwanese people think they are Taiwanese, and if so, 
why; [2] whether Taiwanese people think they are Chinese, and if so, why; [3] 
relationship between the two identities of Taiwanese and Chinese; [4] viewpoint towards 
the government of the ROC, and whether they want to remove “China” from the name of 
the state or not; [5] viewpoint towards the government of the PRC, whether they want to 
reach a merger agreement with it or not; [6] how their US living experience affected their 
national identity. 
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It is difficult to identify such themes, because first, national identity is a 
comprehensive understanding of one’s background of multiple aspects, including 
hometown, language, political rights and economic status. Second, these themes are not 
mutually independent, but are intertwined with each other. Third, these themes are not the 
smallest units of analysis, since each of them can break down into several topics. For 
example, political viewpoint is influenced by one’s party preference and how it is formed, 
among other things. In the analysis, I focused on the themes listed as the stem of 
inspection, and treated details as branches that were logically subordinate to these main 
themes.
6. Participants and Study Limitations
Relevant personal details about the fifteen interviewees are given in the Interviewees 
Information section located at the end of the thesis. Among the fifteen students, 8 are 
male and 7 are female. Ages of interviewees range from 19 to 36, with two interviewees’ 
ages unknown but estimated in the late 20s.
All fifteen Taiwanese students claimed to be Taiwanese in the interviews. Some of 
them also identify themselves as Chinese. (The relationship between the two identities 
will be fully explained in the finding section of the thesis.) The column titled “self 
thinking Chinese” reflects interviewees’ views on whether they hold a Chinese identity. 
About political preferences, there are two main themes that emerged in this study. These 
are [1] preference to remove “Republic of China” from the country’s name, and [2] which 
Taiwanese political party they support. Two columns in the table show whether 
interviewees want “Republic of China” removed, and which Taiwanese political party 
they support. As for Taiwan-China relations, two themes denote interviewees’ ideas 
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towards mainland China. First, what do they hope for Taiwan in the future, and second, 
what do they think will happen to Taiwan in the future. At last, interviewees’ 
grandparents’ place of origin were recorded in the table. Noticing that interviewees were 
in their 20s or 30s, a notable difference in their grandparents’ generation is whether they 
came to Taiwan around 1949, or they had been in Taiwan since long before 1949. 
With regard to representativeness, the major limitation of my research is that I did not 
interview Taiwanese Aborigines (yuan zhu min). All of my interviewees could track their 
ancestry to China, and none of them identified themselves as Taiwanese aborigines. The 
absence of aboriginal Taiwanese student in my study may reflect the minority status of 
the Taiwanese Aboriginal People, as well as their economic disadvantage among all 
Taiwanese residents.
7. Findings Overview
Findings are reported in three sections. The first part of the findings is about a 
Taiwanese identity. Quotes that indicate the existence of a Taiwanese identity are 
presented. This part also presents the evidence that a Chinese component remains as part 
of the Taiwanese identity. An analysis of this Chinese component is presented, and the 
relationship between the Taiwanese identity and the Chinese factor is examined. The 
second part of findings is about Taiwanese students’ viewpoints about their country’s 
independence. It is found that a politically independent Taiwan is desired by most of the 
interviewees. Reasons for such a high degree of identification with independence, and for 
an aversion to possible unification with China are provided in this part. The third part of 
findings inspects how living in the United States affects Taiwanese students’ identities. 
Taiwanese students studying in the United States have more opportunities than their 
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domestic compatriots to interact with people from other parts of the world, as well as 
with people from mainland China. In this part, I present findings that show how 
interaction with different groups of people influence the participants’ national awareness 
and cultural identity, both Taiwanese and Chinese. 
In the Findings section, I take a few measures to ensure the confidentiality of my 
interviewees. First, each interviewee is given a pseudonym. Each of them is randomly 
assigned a family name and a given name. Family names and given names are selected 
from a pool of customary names of Taiwanese people to make the description look vivid. 
Second, if a participant referred to a specific name of a person, such as a family member, 
I also used a pseudonym in such cases.  
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Chapter 4. Findings
Part 1. The Meaning of Taiwanese Identity
The participants in this study reiterated what has been shown in the literature 
regarding the emergence of a Taiwanese identity. Throughout the interviews, the students 
regularly expressed ideas that could clearly be seen as characteristics of a distinct 
Taiwanese identity. At the same time, many of the participants also recognized their 
connection and heritage to China and saw themselves as Chinese. Importantly though, 
being Chinese appears to be a sub-section of a Taiwanese identity, rather than a parallel 
dual identity. In this section, the theme about what it means to be Taiwanese is presented 
in three sections, namely (a). Being distinctively Taiwanese, (b). Being culturally 
Chinese, and (c). Being culturally Chinese as a sub-identity of being Taiwanese.
1a. Being Distinctively Taiwanese
Being distinctively Taiwanese refers to what the interviewees understood and 
perceived as uniquely Taiwanese identity characteristics. Such characteristics included 
three factors, namely geographical distinction, different governments, and culture.
• Geographical Distinction
In terms of geography, the participants emphasized being from Taiwan, or more 
specifically being born and/or raised in Taiwan, as well as pointing out to others that 
being Taiwanese is something different from being anywhere else in the world, including 
China. For example, I asked some of the participants to share how they responded when 
Americans asked, “Where are you from?” As expected, they said Taiwan. For example, “I 
come from Taiwan. That is a fact. I don’t come from China.” Tsai-chieh answered. 
Similarly, Shu-fen said, “I come from Taiwan. It’s not China. It’s different. That’s all.”
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Others emphasized that where one was born determines where one is from. “Since I 
was born in Taiwan, I say I’m from Taiwan. . . If any American or any other foreigner 
asks me, I would say I’m from Taiwan. I’m not from China” (Cheng-han). Likewise, 
when describing where his family was born, Po-jui said,
All my family were born in Taiwan. My father and my mother are so-
called native Taiwanese, though not aboriginal. They are not aboriginal but 
they are native Taiwanese. Just as we say native Americans, we don’t 
mean Indians. Native Americans mean English people coming to America. 
They were native Americans. Indians are aboriginal. My parents are not 
aboriginal but they are native Taiwanese. It means their parents or 
grandparents came to Taiwan several generations ago. They were born in 
Taiwan. 
The fact that one grew up in Taiwan and not China also meant that one was 
Taiwanese. Kuan-ting explained:
With my sisters, I didn’t talk about it. Not that we didn’t talk about it, but 
we have the same viewpoints. We know we are Taiwanese, not Chinese. 
We know we grew up in Taiwan, and our passports say Taiwan. Of course 
we also discuss, but actually it is more than echoing than discussion, 
because we think alike. So we just echoed with each other, saying “Right, 
we do not belong to the mainland. We are from Taiwan.” I said yes. So we 
share our viewpoints. 2
I also asked some of the students if they ever had experiences where they were 
mistaken for Chinese. One student, Tsai-chieh, who had this experience, became upset in 
instances where Americans continued referring to her as being from China, even after she 
said she was from Taiwan. She took it personally and in a negative way when she 
introduced herself as being from Taiwan but later, her professor continued to refer to her 
as being from China. She elaborated:
One professor always says I’m from China. I always correct him in that, 
that I’m from Taiwan. I think I would correct that, maybe not so much 
about the issue we discuss right now, maybe it’s more that you don’t 
respect me. I introduced myself as from Taiwan and you forgot that. It’s 
more like personal! You know what I mean? Just like every time you say 
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that your name is Evan, for example, and next time he sees you and says 
hi, Mary. Something like that. 
Others, however, were not personally bothered by the mix-ups. They explained that 
most people in America just assume they are Chinese, as they are ignorant about the 
differences between China and Taiwan, or just assume everyone they meet who looks like 
they are from East Asia is Chinese. Shu-fen would just say “yes” when asked if she was 
Chinese but if probed more, she would explain that she was from Taiwan: “If they ask me 
if I am Chinese, I'll say yes. Because I don't think everyone understands our situation. If 
someone would like to know more, I'll tell them that I'm from Taiwan, I'm also 
Taiwanese.”
In contrast, Chun-chiao stated that she never would say she was Chinese, even though 
she acknowledged that her ancestors came from China. She said, “We think we are 
Taiwanese. But you know from history, we came from China. But we won’t say we are 
Chinese.” Chia-hao also talked about the lack of understanding here in the States and 
quickly correcting the mistakes when he said:
A lot of people are confused, including my former colleague in my lab, 
saying “Hey, you are Chinese,” and I immediately said, “No I’m not 
Chinese I’m Taiwanese.” So she is really confused, saying “You still are 
kind of like Chinese to us.” Because she studied JD [law] before, she 
thought according to American policies, I’m part of China. But I don’t 
think I’m part of China. 
Another student, Chun-hung, said most people thought he was from Korea, and he 
made a very broad statement, “What I know of America, is (that they are) not really good 
at telling which country you come from if you are Asian. They think we are all the same.”
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• Independent Government
Several students said they were Taiwanese because their country was Taiwan. As 
evidence, some said they hold Taiwanese citizenship and Taiwanese passports. For 
example, Po-jui said, “I am not a citizen of the PRC or Hong Kong. I am a citizen of 
Taiwan.” Likewise, Chih-ming said:
It is defined by citizenship. It is defined by our passport with it number 
beginning with letter A. It is defined by many details in our lifestyle. The 
boundary of the administrative control defines the boundary of our 
identity. 3
Further, when comparing China and Taiwan, some students specifically stated that 
they were two different countries because they have been under the rules of two 
completely different governments and presidents, with Taiwan’s Republic of China being 
a democracy, and the mainland’s People’s Republic of China being a totalitarian regime. 
For example, Chun-hung said, “We are already independent.” Hung-yang felt the same 
way, “China is China. I would say it is a country numerous times bigger than Taiwan. At 
the same time, it thinks Taiwan belongs to itself, though I think we are quite separate. 4”
Shu-fen went into more details by stressing the importance of voting in the Taiwanese 
government elections as evidence of an independent country. She stated:
When did I define that I was Taiwanese? Maybe after I grew up and we 
started to vote. We have competing elections in recent years. I would think 
we are a country. 
Comparably, Li-hua underlined the importance of voting and perceiving Taiwan as its 
own country: 
But our family, I mean my parents and my brother, we can vote. We think 
Taiwan is a country, and we chose whoever benefits our country in the 
election, not those who are prepared to merge with China. 5
34
Another student alluded to the political history of Taiwan when asserting its 
independence from China.
Taiwan is no longer part of China, since we are just like... how to say that? 
You know, Taiwan area was given away by the old China government, the 
Qing dynasty, when they were defeated by Japan. So Taiwan was a 
territory of Japan. At that time, Taiwan was no longer part of China. 
(Cheng-han)
A Taiwanese identity also emerged when several of the students made comparisons 
between Taiwan and other sovereign states. Chun-chiao mentioned a trade dispute about 
beef between Taiwan and the United States. She told me recently the Taiwanese 
government started allowing the import of beef from America, which Taiwanese people 
say contains potentially toxic chemicals such as rectopamine and clenbuterol:
For example, recently, I’m not sure it is the idea of Ma Ying-jeou or of the 
Council of Agriculture, they said we should allow importing American 
beef. They said that we only eat the beef part and do not eat viscera, and 
those chemicals only exist in viscera. But if it is injected and exists in 
viscera, how can it be possible that it doesn’t exist in the meat? So 
Taiwanese people, especially the DPP [Democratic Progressive Party] side 
asked why Ma Ying-jeou allowed importing American beef. They said it 
doesn’t matter, we can ensure citizens’ security and diplomatic policy at 
the same time. But since they brought about diplomatic policy, obviously 
they care more about diplomatic policy than citizens’ health. 6 
Chun-hung talked about foreign countries’ cultural influences on Taiwan:
I would say Japan influenced Taiwan a lot. Mostly the pop culture and the 
food. I would say... Korea as well, they influence Taiwan a lot. It’s the 
closest country beside China to Taiwan. Mostly the pop culture and the 
food, the language, TV shows. . . 
Coincidentally, many interviews were conducted when the three governments, 
namely the Republic of China, the People’s Republic of China and Japan were disputing 
over the sovereignty over an archipelago called Diaoyutai in Chinese, or Senkaku in 
Japanese. Participants’ views on the sovereignty of the islands reflected that Taiwan was 
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an equal state to China and Japan. Shih-han supported her country’s claim that Diaoyu 
Islands belonged to Taiwan:
Actually I feel they are ours, but it seems we cannot get them back. . . It’s 
difficult. . . Just as our international recognition. It is something we 
deserve but cannot achieve. But I think we are going to try. We might go 
on trying [to get it]. 7
Kuan-ting, however, was not so optimistic about Taiwan’s chances of controlling the 
islands, based on his estimates of Taiwan’s military muscle:
Three adjacent countries, Taiwan wants it, China wants it, Japan also 
wants it. So if possible, if Japan demands it so much and China also 
demands it so much, and Taiwan, in case a war breaks out, we cannot win. 
So we might say let’s forget about it. We just give it up, so we wouldn’t 
spend our military resources on it, because we cannot win against the 
other two countries. Japan might have a chance with China, but Taiwan is 
almost sure to lose. Based on my knowledge about our armed forces and 
our military personnel, I do not have too much confidence. 8
Chun-hung was quite philosophical about the islands, implying he was interested in 
the disputes among the three countries:
From the point of view of Taiwanese, I would say, as lots of Taiwanese 
say, I would say Diaoyutai is ours. But the Chinese would say Diaoyutai is 
theirs and Japanese would say Diaoyutai is theirs. Just this, we don’t need 
to fight over the island because the island is on its own, and we don’t have 
to care whose part it is. It is a funny problem. 
While feeling that Taiwan is its own country separate from China, a few respondents 
also acknowledged that Taiwan was not widely recognized by the international 
community. For instance, Tsai-chieh clearly perceived certain “facts” that made her from 
an independent country of Taiwan, but that were not recognized externally, specifically 
by China. She explained,
I think Taiwan is now an independent country, because we have our own 
president and we have our own passport. So I think that is a fact. Maybe 
many people have disagreement about that, and maybe we have 
international documents that can be argued against that fact, but I think 
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that is a fact. It’s just a fact not being accepted by China and by 
international countries. 
Cheng-han felt the same way as Tsai-chieh, but elaborated to point out contradictions 
in the international community declaring Taiwan is not an independent country, yet 
treating it as if it were in practice, such as when issuing visas. He said,
You know it’s very interesting that they give us visas on our passports. It’s 
a shame that the US government doesn’t recognize Taiwan as a country, 
probably because of some pressure from China or international, they 
cannot say Taiwan is a country. I forgot the year when Taiwan, or Republic 
of China, they left the United Nations. At that time, the Republic of China 
was no longer a country recognized in the international world. Now we 
prefer to use “Taiwan” as our country name, but we have lots of pressure. 
Like the Chinese government, they will make conflict with it. Probably 
most of the countries are so afraid of China, so at that time they wouldn’t 
recognize [Taiwan as a country]. But still they give us visas. We are 
allowed to visit their countries, without any problem. 
Similarly to Cheng-han, Shu-fen also described what she saw as a contradiction 
between what objectively signified that a country was indeed a country, and how Taiwan 
was perceived as not a country by the diplomatic arena, despite meeting the definition of 
a country.
That's weird. The teacher told us that when you become a country, you 
have your land, your people, your government. I forgot the fourth factor 
but we have all these four factors and [yet] we cannot become a country. 
Most of the reason is that in the international community, we don't have 
many friends. Just like we cannot get into the United Nations. 
A common theme in many of these quotes is that the participants expressed a clear 
subjective identification of Taiwan as an independent sovereign country with its own 
government and politics, despite lacking the external objective recognition of such by the 
international community.
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• Culture
A final point that some of the students emphasized as evidence of a distinctive 
Taiwanese identity was having a culture that was shared by all Taiwanese but different 
from that of China. They mentioned the Taiwanese language, lifestyle and personality. 
Although Taiwan’s main and official language is Chinese, there is also a Taiwanese 
language being spoken on the island. Although the Taiwanese language can communicate 
the Fujianese accent in China, interviewees use the term “Taiwanese” to identify this 
language. When I asked Chun-chiao about the Taiwanese language, I asked: “So when 
you talk about Taiwanese, do you mean Aboriginal Taiwanese language, or Taiwanese 
Chinese, or Chinese with a Fujian accent?”
She answered evasively: “We will say Taiwanese.”
For the difference between the lifestyle in Taiwan and that in China, one participant 
made reference to rejecting China in regard to the lifestyle on the mainland. Shu-fen 
explained,
You don't have to ask me if I'm Taiwanese or Chinese. You can ask me do 
I want to live the lifestyle just like China? I would say I don't want to live 
the lifestyle in China. Just because of the right of speech, the media. It's 
kind of sad. That's the value we cannot accept. It's better, it's more 
important thing for us. That's what I think distinguishes us. (Shu-fen)
Another participant also made a comparison between Taiwan’s lifestyle and China’s 
lifestyle,
There are too many restrictions in China. Everything is controlled. You 
might even be monitored. That is not a free country. We have gotten quite 
used to freedom now, and we have been accustomed to being Westernized. 
We would think, “Why do you interfere with us? For example, why can 
we not use YouTube? Why can we not use Facebook?” About these, you 
would think, “What the heck are you doing?” I guess people in mainland 
China might also be unsatisfied by this situation. (Hsiu-ying) 9
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A third participant referred to differences in personality traits that distinguished her 
and others from Taiwan as Taiwanese. Li-hua contrasted the Taiwanese personality with 
that of the Chinese. She said,
As for people, I feel we have different cultures. Taiwanese are more 
euphemist, maybe because we received education from Japan, I guess. 
With Japanese education, Taiwanese may be more euphemist than 
Chinese. Compared to Taiwanese, mainland Chinese are more vocal. I 
know a lot of Chinese here, and they are friendly to me. But as for 
personality, we still have differences. Chinese seem more vocal, in my 
opinion, compared with me. They do not hesitate to express themselves. 10
Li-hua went on to illustrate differences in personality among girls.
Those Chinese girls I know are stronger than Taiwanese. Generally almost 
all are like that. Some Chinese girls told me that I shouldn’t be so mild. 
They thought we Taiwanese girls were too docile, too submissive. I know 
many strong Chinese girls. Yes, especially girls. 11
Hsiu-ying made several comparisons about the national characters of Taiwan and 
several other countries:
Taiwan has been under control of others for a long time, so they are self-
abased. They’ve always been self-abased, and they think their culture is 
inferior, so they are not united. And also, Taiwanese are xenophiles. They 
love foreign countries and cultures way too much, as you can see. For 
example, China started boycotting Japan because of the Diaoyutai Islands. 
Taiwan was also frequently bullied by South Korea, like in Taekwondo 
games internationally. But Taiwanese simply cannot unite themselves and 
boycott Korean products... I think this is where Taiwanese need 
improvement. They really should be more cohesive internally with each 
other. 12
Chih-ming, a male student with a social science background, shared with me his 
interesting perspective of how a unique Taiwanese culture constitutes a Taiwanese 
identity:
Identity, in my opinion, we should talk about it in different contexts... It is 
a relative concept, and not an absolute one. The absolute part of an identity 
is only introductory, maybe it’s only common sense... Like we have the 
same government, we have military duty, or it represents a country or a 
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culture. That is all very dry. In my opinion, identity is only meaningful 
when we talk about it in a relative context... like I know you are pro-blue 
or pro-green, but we are in the same framework. Another example, in 
Taiwan there is delicious food, and where can you eat it? Something that is 
found in Tainan is only in Tainan. This is the interesting part of identity. I 
am like Foucault, his French way of life, the life having been 
contemplated, its subtle details. The routine of every day of sociology, that 
is identity. 13
1b. Being Culturally Chinese
Although a Taiwanese identity has fully grown among all my interviewees, a Chinese 
factor nevertheless remains part of the identity of some of them. Three factors were 
identified as distinctively Chinese.
• State’s History
The state that governs Taiwan now is still called the Republic of China. Heatedly 
disputed though, the name still appeals to some of the participants. Although the Republic 
of China hardly exerts any actual control over China, it seems quite hesitant to renounce 
its sovereignty over the area that is now under communist rule (Mainland Affairs Council 
2012), just as in the case of its continental counterpart’s claim on Taiwan. For those 
participants who maintain that the name “Republic of China” should remain intact, their 
identity is inevitably influenced by it. For example, Shih-han said: “Since the time of Sun 
Yat-sen, there has been the Republic of China. Because we inherited his legacy, we 
should keep its name. We can say it is the Republic of China in Taiwan.” 14
Yu-lan, a female graduate student said, 
Because now we are using the name Republic of China. Of course I think 
Taiwan is a country, but if seen from the perspective of history or 
geography, Taiwan is actually a geographical term, not the name of a 
country. If you treat Taiwan as the name of a country, you would have to 
prove that, by education and other means. This is going to be a really huge 
revolution. 15
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Chun-hung also thinks the name of the Republic of China should be kept, saying, 
I don’t really think we need to change the name. It’s been..... We have 
been that way for a long time. If someone wants to change it, it probably 
has already happened. 
Since the purpose of this part is to present how state history plays a positive role in a 
culturally Chinese identity, only opinions that support the maintenance of the name 
“Republic of China” are introduced. Understanding that it is a controversial topic whether 
to keep or remove “Republic of China,” I will discuss opposite viewpoints in later parts 
of this thesis.
• Ancestry
The second element that constitutes the Chinese identity is ancestry. In fact, all my 
interviewees can trace their relatively recent ancestors to China. For some of them, their 
grandparents came to Taiwan with the Kuomintang retreat in 1949, and they are the 
second generation after the exodus. Tsai-chieh said, “Both my grandfather and 
grandmother came from mainland China after World War II.” Kuan-ting talked about his 
grandfather: “My grandfather grew up in Yunnan. He came to Taiwan in his 20s or 30s. 
He’s been in Taiwan for almost fifty years.” 16
Chun-jiao’s ancestors came to Taiwan from China earlier than those of Tsai-chieh and 
Kuan-ting. She narrated her family’s story, “My dad has been to Zhangzhou.  He found 
our ancestors there, with our family name Zheng. So from last year, we had our pedigree. 
So I am the seventh or eighth generation of those who came from Zhangzhou [to 
Taiwan].” 17 Li-hua’s ancestors also came from China: “[My pedigree] says, my surname 
is Wu. And then it says Zhejiang. But I don’t know when they came. They should have 
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been here for several generations. They did not come with the Kuomintang in the Year 38 
of the ROC. Not at that time. 18
• Language
The third contributor to the Chinese factor within the Taiwanese identity is language. 
The official language of Taiwan is Mandarin Chinese, as is for China. Speaking the 
Chinese language on a daily basis is an important reminder for some of my interviewees 
that their culture comes from China. Chih-ming said, “I am Chinese. I think it depends on 
what you mean by Chinese, because as the English language goes for the recent century 
or two, the word Chinese is Chinese-speaking. 19” Shih-han shared Chih-ming’s 
interpretation of the word “Chinese” by saying, “I am Chinese. I speak Chinese.” More 
than that, she is even proud of the cultural legacy. When I asked her if she thought 
Taiwan needed to establish a cultural/language institute, like China’s Confucius Institute, 
to promote Chinese culture, Shih-han said:
We don’t seem to have such an institute. But we’ve been taught traditional 
Chinese characters. We can recite the Four Books and Five Classics. We 
learned the Three Hundred Tang Poems from childhood. We have 
practiced calligraphy all the way. I think they are already deep in our 
bones. 20
When asked whether she thought Chinese culture in Taiwan is more traditional than 
that in China, she said, 
I don’t think it is more traditional. I do not have the notion of being more 
or less traditional. But since we have been this way, we should keep the 
tradition. Like I use traditional Chinese characters, keep the ancient 
language. If it is what we can do, then we should do it better. (Shih-han) 21
Li-hua’s identity also contains a Chinese element. But compared to Shih-han, her 
Chinese identity is more blurred:
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When someone asks me if I am Chinese, I would say: kind of, I’m from 
Taiwan. I would still say I come from Taiwan. That’s it. I feel there is a 
huge difference, politically. But other parts, we speak the same language, 
and our culture actually came from China. So I’m not sure what I can say. 
22
• Not Being Chinese
Although for some interviewees a Chinese component remains part of their identity, 
for others they do not think they are Chinese at all, in spite of the factors listed above. 
Cheng-han did not think he was Chinese, and he thought the Chinese culture in Taiwan 
should not be labeled as Chinese culture because it has already changed a lot:
I don’t think we are Chinese because we learn Chinese culture. Because 
people in Taiwan think they are from China, my thinking is that (this idea 
is) from Chiang Kai-shek government. They say “You are Chinese”. So I 
don’t think Chinese culture influences me in anything. I even won’t say 
it’s Chinese culture. I would say it’s traditional culture. 
Chun-chiao was quite vocal when she negated the statement that she was Chinese: 
“Yes. We think we are Taiwanese. But you know, from history, from history we say we 
come from China. But we won’t say we are Chinese.”
Chia-hao thinks “Chinese refers to people--not people in other countries, but people 
living in China.” As a result, he also indicated that he was exclusively Taiwanese: “Right, 
a lot of people are confused, including my former colleague in my lab, saying Hey, you 
are Chinese, and I immediately said no I’m not Chinese I’m Taiwanese.”
Kuan-ting shared Chia-hao’s identity. When I asked him in English whether he 
thought he was Chinese, he answered also in English: “Ah no, I don’t. I think I’m 
Taiwanese. I was born and raised in Taiwan.” Hsiu-ying made a general statement about 
Taiwanese people, saying, “In the consciousness of Taiwanese, we would not say we 
43
belong to China. We would say we belong to Taiwan. We are not Chinese, we are 
Taiwanese.” 23
Wei-sheng was also asked in English the question about his Chinese identity. He 
rejected the Chinese notion indirectly:
Interviewer: Then, do you think you are Chinese?
Wei-sheng: I would say Taiwanese. 24
Like Wei-sheng, Yu-lan was being polite by avoiding a direct negative answer at first. 
But after I followed up, she expressed herself in a straightforward manner:
Interviewer: Then do you think you are Chinese?
Yu-lan: Chinese? Um, I would introduce myself as Taiwanese. Because for 
the most part, when you introduce yourself, where you come from, you 
say, “I’m from Taiwan,” then naturally it means you are Taiwanese. So I 
introduce myself as Taiwanese.
Interviewer: If somebody asks you: are you Chinese? Do you answer yes 
or no, or something else?
Yu-lan: No. Because in general, China means mainland China. 25
1c. Being Culturally Chinese as a Sub-identity of Being Taiwanese
However, being culturally Chinese is not entirely a factor that brings Taiwan closer to 
China. Due to the fact that China’s culture has undergone severe modification or even 
destruction in mainland China since the communist take-over, the Chinese culture now in 
China is far from what it used to be before the Kuomintang left the mainland for Taiwan. 
Taiwan’s culture is far from what it was then, too. When I asked Tsai-chieh about her 
opinion on Taiwan’s Chinese culture and the mainland’s Chinese culture, she said, 
“Chinese culture? That’s really weird thing, because we are more traditional than people 
in China.” Sharing Tsai-chieh’s viewpoint, Cheng-han, a male graduate student pointed 
out, “We would think we have more traditional [culture]... Because you know, China had 
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the Cultural Revolution. At that time, they broke too many traditions.” Among the many 
cultural factors, Chun-chiao mentioned the simplification of the written form of the 
Chinese language by saying, “When Mao Zedong changed something, like simplifying 
Chinese characters, something original disappeared in China. My dad told me that.” 
Kuan-ting said when he was...
Reading many books, sometimes the book was written by a mainland 
Chinese writer, I could not read those simplified Chinese characters. I 
don’t mean I couldn’t read even a single one of them, but many... 
Basically I do not understand at all. I need to guess what a character is, by 
its preceding and following character. If you show me a single simplified 
character, I have no idea what it is. (Kuan-ting) 26
Shih-han, the girl mentioned previously who was ardent about keeping traditional 
Chinese culture in Taiwan, thinks it a mission to protect the traditional culture from 
China. She said: “I hope we can keep being independent. We can write our traditional 
form of language, and enjoy our freedom of speech. I think it’s very important to us.” 27
Apart from the difference within the written form of the language, cross-strait 
vocabulary differences also distinguish Taiwan from China. Chia-hao’s father mainly 
works in China. Chia-hao said when his father went back home in Taiwan, he sometimes 
had difficulty understanding the vocabulary his father used. “A lot of vocabulary we don’t 
use in Taiwan, but he (dad) uses it. Like we say ‘print out the document for me,’ you will 
say 打印 right? But we will say 印出來. So it’s totally different. [Another example] like 
滑鼠 and 鼠標. So sometimes when he comes back to Taiwan for Chinese New Year, we 
would say, “what did you say?” And we’d feel confused.” (Explanation for readers who 
do not read Chinese: 打印 and 印出來 are simply two different verbs that both mean 
printing. Similarly, 滑鼠 and 鼠標 are two nouns that both mean a mouse, the device that 
is attached to a computer.)
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Chia-hao is not the only one who feels confused by different usages of words. Li-hua 
expressed the same viewpoint when she said, “At first I had a little difficulty 
understanding what they [her Chinese friends] said, but gradually I understood. In my lab 
there is an auntie from China. She is a technician. Sometimes I had to think a bit. [But] I 
understand most of what she said. 28
As discussed, Taiwan maintains many aspects of traditional Chinese culture better 
than China, which experienced a series of revolutions, thus some of the students think 
Taiwan is culturally more Chinese. However, being more traditionally Chinese than 
China does not bring Taiwan closer to China. Contrarily, since contemporary China has 
been under communist control for more than half a century, the Chinese culture in China 
is no longer the “traditional culture” in Taiwan. Thus the fact that Taiwan is culturally 
Chinese could be seen as an antithesis of Taiwan being socio-politically Chinese.
Among those students who said they were both Taiwanese and Chinese, they 
indicated that there was a split between their cultural identity and their political identity. 
Tsai-chieh dichotomized her identity into a cultural aspect and a socio-political aspect by 
saying:
Right now, in this situation, no matter whether I like or not, Taiwan is an 
independent country because we have our [own] president, right? 
Another male student expressed the similar viewpoint: “I am a Taiwanese, because of 
my blood, my culture. However, I am a Chinese, culturally. Of course I am not a citizen 
of the PRC or Hong Kong. I am a citizen of Taiwan.” (Po-jui)
Several other students expressed their support for their own country. For instance, Li-
hua expressly told me about her viewpoint: “Politically, I think Taiwan is a country.” 29 
Wei-sheng also vocally talked about his similar idea by rejecting China as foreign to him. 
46
When asked the question about how he saw China, he said: “It’s another country,” 30 an 
answer that represents a noticeable distinction between his in-group of Taiwan and out-
group of China. The same answer was also provided by Shih-han when she was asked the 
same question.
Here it is necessary to bring up two Chinese words with different subtleties. The two 
words are zhong guo ren (中國人) and hua ren (華人). Subject to individual 
interpretation, both words can be translated into the English word “Chinese.” Consistent 
with customary understanding, the students who think of themselves as Chinese drew a 
clear semantic boundary between the two terms. Chun-hung is one of them:
Interviewer: Speaking of the term Chinese, what do you think of the 
difference between zhong guo ren and hua ren?
Chun-hung: I think hua ren mainly means, it’s a noun for all people who 
speak Chinese, like Chinese and Taiwanese. But zhong guo ren is mainly 
for China.
Interviewer: People who live there or are from there?
Chun-hung: Yes.
Li-hua agreed with Chun-hung’s opinion by saying:
I think zhong guo ren refers to people of mainland China. As for hua ren, I 
would say anyone who speaks Mandarin Chinese is hua ren. This is my 
opinion. 31
Kuan-ting gave a very detailed description of what he thought was the difference 
between the two terms:
Zhong guo ren and hua ren? I think they are different. Zhong guo ren 
simply means people growing up in mainland China, and hua ren is a 
wider term. It’s like American and white. American means people who 
grow up in the United States of America, and white refers to people of 
white race. See for example, we both are hua ren, but you are zhong guo 
ren and I am Taiwanese. But we both are hua ren. One person who speaks 
Chinese, maybe in Singapore, is also hua ren. But he is a Singapore hua 
ren, and he is Singaporean. Same is true for Malaysia, Hong Kong and the 
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Philippines. Hua ren who grow up in the United States are also Chinese or 
Taiwanese American, but he is American hua ren. So zhong guo ren and 
hua ren are different. 32
The perceived differences between the two Chinese words provide a way to examine 
the identity of those participants who claimed themselves simultaneously as Taiwanese 
and Chinese. Shih-han, a female student, saying she was Chinese, added that “if it means 
zhong guo ren, I would not say that.” Like Shih-han, Shu-fen also rejects the term zhong 
guo ren:
Yes I am hua ren but I am not zhong-guo ren. So that’s different... zhong 
guo ren... that would not be my term. 
An interviewee accepted that he was zhong guo ren, which might result in a socio-
political interpretation of his sense of being Chinese. However, inspecting what he 
explained about the term zhong guo ren, one can find that the term he used is also 
confined to the cultural division.   On the cultural nature of the Chinese identity and the 
political nature of the Taiwanese identity, Hung-yang elaborated:
I would not say zhong guo, because that means you are from mainland 
China. But if it is hua ren, that is for sure. Culturally, we all say we are 
Chinese, because we have almost the same cultural origin. So if you say 
you are zhong guo ren because you speak Chinese, we say yes, culturally. 
But if it is about politics, about being from Taiwan or from mainland 
China, we would say we are Taiwanese. (Hung-yang) 33
As seen from those quotes, those students who claimed to be both Taiwanese and 
Chinese apparently split their identity into a politically Taiwanese part, and a culturally 
Chinese part. They claimed to be Chinese solely on the cultural ground, and they rejected 
the Chinese notion when it comes to their socio-political identity. This reflects the 
different levels of the Taiwanese identity and the Chinese identity. While the Taiwanese 
identity is a multi-faceted awareness that is generally accepted by all interviewees, the 
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Chinese identity is accepted by a limited number of interviewees. At the same time, the 
definition of the Chinese identity is confined to the cultural and historical aspect. This 
reflects that the Chinese identity is one component of the Taiwanese identity.
1d. Part 1 Summary
Comprehensively speaking, the free-standing Taiwanese identity is more prevalent 
than the Chinese one. Among all fifteen interviewees, all of them clearly indicated that 
they were Taiwanese, while only eight of them also acknowledged that they were 
Chinese. 
Analytically, as discussed in sections 1a, 1b and 1c, it is noticed that the Taiwanese 
identity is comprised of various facets, including geographical, social-political and 
cultural. The Chinese identity, however, is confined to the cultural division, such as the 
name of the government, origin of ancestry of Taiwanese residents, and the Chinese 
language. When an interviewee described having a Chinese identity, it was only on a 
cultural basis; it was rejected when it comes to the socio-political aspect. The conclusion 
is, the Chinese self-awareness held by Taiwanese is not parallel to their Taiwanese 
identity, but a sub-identity of the Taiwanese one. While the Taiwanese identity is a fully 
flavored self-notion that is supported by a separate society and a democratic government, 
the Chinese identity is one component of the cultural aspect of Taiwanese people’s self-
identification.
Kuan-ting’s quote sums up all three aspects of what it means to be Taiwanese, 
including reference to a Chinese component when he said:
I feel I am Taiwanese. I grew up in Taiwan. I hold a Taiwanese passport. 
As far as I am concerned, I am Taiwanese. Although I know some of my 
family came from China, I am Taiwanese. Growing up in such a small 
place, it makes me recognize myself as Taiwanese. What’s more, I have a 
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Taiwanese passport. I read traditional Chinese characters, and it seems 
Taiwanese are now the only people who use traditional Chinese 
characters. Yes, I am Taiwanese. 34
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Part 2. Independence Versus Unification
Ever since being replaced by the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations in 
1971, the government of the Republic of China has been denied official recognition as a 
sovereign state by major countries in the world. As of December 18, 2012, Taiwan has 
diplomatic relations with only 23 countries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012) of some 
200 in the world. Additionally, major intergovernmental organizations deny Taiwan 
admission. For example, the United Nations refuses to recognize Taiwan as a member 
state. Another example, perhaps the most apparent, is the Olympic Games. Taiwan was 
represented as Chinese Taipei, and they could not use the national flag of the Republic of 
China.
Faced with a difficult international environment, the people of Taiwan are concerned 
about the status of their country. As a result, my interviews with Taiwanese students 
about their national identity included extensive discussions about independence and 
unification between the PRC and the ROC.
2a. Independence
Overall, participants talked about independence from two perspectives. One 
perspective is the independence of Taiwan from the People’s Republic of China. It means 
Taiwan’s autonomous sovereignty without the interference of the PRC. This aspect of 
independence is defined as administrative independence. The second perspective of 
independence involves promotion of a free-standing Taiwanese nationality, and 
elimination of the “Chinese-ness” of Taiwan. In this light, the second perspective of 
independence is labeled as ethnic independence.
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• Administrative Independence
In the preceding part (Findings, Part 1. Meaning of Taiwanese Identity), it was 
reported that a Taiwanese identity has emerged. This Taiwanese identity consists of 
several components, including the fact that Taiwan is now under the administration of an 
independent government, which is the Republic of China. Consistently, all my 
participants displayed their awareness of this fact.
Generally, the interviewees are not concerned with the administrative autonomy of 
their own government. They are assured on the point that the two governments on either 
side of the Taiwan Strait function on an autonomous basis, with neither side exerting 
political control over the other. For instance, Tsai-chieh said, “Right now, in this 
situation, no matter whether I like it or not, Taiwan is an independent country because we 
have our [own] president, right?” Similarly, Chun-hung said, “We are already 
independent.” Hung-yang felt the same way, “China is China. Rather than thinking it 
threatens Taiwan, I would say it is a country numerous times bigger than Taiwan. At the 
same time, it thinks Taiwan belongs to itself, though I think we are quite separate.” 35 Li-
hua expressly told me that, “Politically, I think Taiwan is a country.” 36
Shu-fen also realized that Taiwan as a political entity was functioning on a completely 
independent basis, but could not help complaining that her country was not 
internationally recognized:
Interviewer: Anyway you have an independent government.
Shu-fen: Yeah. That's weird. The teacher told us that when you become a 
country, you have your land, your people, your government. I forgot the 
fourth factor but we all have these four factors and we cannot become a 
country. Most of the reason is that in international community, we don't 
have many friends. Just like we cannot get into the United Nations.
52
Chun-hung, an undergraduate who came to America when he was at his high-school 
age, was not quite concerned with the political dispute, although he was clear about the 
fact that his country is administratively autonomous:
Interviewer: Being from Taiwan, how do you see China as your biggest 
neighbor?
Chun-hung: From my point of view, I think it is the biggest country close 
to us. I don’t really care about politics, it’s all a political thing. I am not 
involved in this talking. I just say it is a country but sometimes political 
issues are kind of annoying, cause they fight every day.
Compared to Chun-hung, Kuan-ting was more involved in the tough relationship 
between Taiwan and China:
For me it is all a political issue. Of course politically speaking, China has 
always been giving Taiwan hard times, as is known by the whole world. 
But for me, I think it’s all right. Because, let me see, we are quite separate. 
If you [China] don’t make trouble with us, we wouldn’t make trouble with 
you. Same is true backward. So I think... But politically, we do feel a lot of 
pressure. 37
Shih-han also talked about the political entanglement between Taiwan and China. She 
was considerate of, and thus tolerant about view-points that she did not agree with. When 
asked about the pressure China put on Taiwan, she said: “I feel pressure. But from 
China’s standing, it is normal that they claim Taiwan. Although they are two different 
countries, they had been together in history. So there are different viewpoints from 
different standings.” 38
To sum up, the participants were well aware that Taiwan as an administrative entity 
was functioning independently, without direct interference from another government. All 
interviewees reached the consensus that Taiwan was a politically independent country, 
although its status as a nation-state is not widely recognized by the international 
community. 
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• Ethnic Independence
The second meaning of independence expressed by the interviewees involved Taiwan 
as a free-standing ethnicity, instead of being part of the Chinese ethnicity. Some 
participants indicated their wish that Taiwan establish itself as an independent ethnicity, 
without always being shadowed by the history of continental China that is carried over by 
the government of the ROC. Wei-sheng advocated the emergence of Taiwan’s ethnic 
independence:
Wei-sheng: Most of us think we belong to the Republic of China, although 
its territory is questionable. Some of them want independence, or I would 
say now Taiwan has already been independent. However, in my opinion, 
Taiwan indeed needs independence, but not from mainland China because 
we do not belong to mainland China in any way. The independence should 
be from the Republic of China... 
Interviewer: Independence from the Republic of China?
Wei-sheng: Yes, because the boundary of the Republic of China is very 
weird.
Interviewer: Weird?
Wei-sheng: Because it includes mainland China. 39
Chih-ming, who accepts being Chinese, supports the agenda of an independent 
Taiwanese identity. He defined the Taiwanese ethnicity via citizenship, culture and 
sovereignty:
Interviewer: Do you think there is now an ethnicity which is called 
Taiwanese?
Chih-ming: I feel there is, but it is fractured.... It is defined by citizenship. 
It is defined by our passport with it number beginning with letter A. It is 
defined by the many details in our lifestyle. The boundary of the 
administrative control defines the boundary of our identity. 40
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Contrary to Chih-ming, Yu-lan did not agree that Taiwan is an ethnic entity:
Of course I think Taiwan is a country, but if seen from history or 
geography, Taiwan is actually a geographical term, not the name of a 
country. If you treat Taiwan as the name of a country, you would have to 
prove that, from education and other aspects. This is going to be a really 
huge revolution. (Yu-lan) 41
In fact, for most of the interviewees, ethnic independence does not seem to be an 
important issue, since most of them did not talk about it during the interview. However, 
because Taiwan as a national identity now exists, an ethnic identity may also be on the 
rise, and may take more definite shape in the future. Future study is needed to track a 
potentially independent Taiwanese ethnicity.
• Removal of “Republic of China” as the Name of the State
An individual Taiwanese student’s preference to remove the name “Republic of 
China” might potentially be a signal of his/her ethnic identity. However, no pattern was 
found in my sample between the preference for removal of the “Republic of China” and 
whether a person thinks of him/herself as Chinese. A person who rejects being Chinese 
may want to maintain the name “Republic of China,” while a person who thinks of 
himself as Chinese may want to get rid of this name.
A taxonomy is delineated to categorize all interviewees:
Self-thinking
Chinese
Self-thinking
not Chinese Total
Keeping “ROC”
Removing “ROC”
Total
4 3 7
4 4 8
8 7 15
(Table 3)
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It is relatively easy to understand why a participant who regards oneself as Chinese 
wants to keep “Republic of China” as the name of the state that governs Taiwan. Shih-
han is one of these students:
Interviewer: Do you think Taiwan should cancel the name “Republic of 
China?”
Shih-han: No I don’t think so, because it is indeed our name.
Interviewer: But I think it might confuse many people, wondering why 
Taiwan is the “Republic of China.”
Shih-han: But in my view, since the time of Sun Yat-sen, there has been 
the Republic of China. Since we inherited his legacy, we should keep its 
name. We can say it is the Republic of China in Taiwan. 42
It is also easy to understand why a student who does not regard him/herself as 
Chinese wants to remove the “Republic of China” from the name of their country. As 
Chia-hao indicated, he would like to take “China” out of the name of Taiwan to 
distinguish it: “But I don’t think I’m part of China. If we can take China out of our name, 
I would like to.”
As the table above shows, there are some interviewees who think of themselves as 
Chinese, but want to remove “Republic of China” from their country’s name. Their 
motivation for support of the removal of “ROC” seems largely pragmatic. Shu-fen said, 
“If it can be distinguished and make people know that, I would like to do that (change the 
name).” Hung-yang gave a detailed account of his rationale for “ROC” removal. 
Basically he has two reasons to delete “Republic of China:” One reason is to clear up the 
confusion between China and Taiwan and buffer the tension between the two countries. 
I agree with this point (removing “ROC”), because China has been 
quarreling with Taiwan over this point. They only acknowledge one China, 
as far as I know. So I think why must you call yourself “Republic of 
China?” Why don’t you just say you are Taiwan? I have always been using 
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just Taiwan since I was a child, and I never cared about “Republic of 
China.” It is difficult to use, and if you talk with some politically 
enthusiastic people, no matter whether they come from China or Taiwan, 
you couldn’t really say it aloud. You cannot say that you are from the 
Republic of China, because it might offend classmates from China, and I 
don’t like this. So why not say it is just Taiwan? 43
The other reason is to distinguish Taiwan from China in the international community:
You say you are a country, but your name is confusing, so let’s see. And if 
you say you are Republic of China, . . . how many people on earth know 
what it is! They might say it is just China. It makes it easier for us to be 
just called Taiwan. (Hung-yang) 44
Li-hua, who accepted being Chinese, shared Hung-yang’s idea. When she was asked 
whether Taiwan should cancel the name “Republic of China”, she said,
I think it should. If you tell other people, our passport says “Republic of 
China,” and we need to tell them we are Taiwanese, and we come from 
Taiwan. Sometimes it confuses people from other countries. So I think it is 
necessary to change the name. 45
A pragmatic consideration is also Cheng-han’s reason for removing “Republic of 
China,” besides the fact that he denies being Chinese:
The main reason for me is that we can eliminate all the confusion. ’Cause 
if you say, “I’m from the Republic of China,” they will say, “Are you from 
China?” And I say, “No I’m from Taiwan.” But they say, “OK, I know 
Taiwan, but your passport says it’s China, it’s Republic of China, you are 
from China.” That makes people confused. 
Also, there are some students who do not think of themselves as Chinese, but want to 
keep “Republic of China” despite that they deny being Chinese as part of their identity. 
Kuan-ting, a male undergraduate student who denies Chinese as his identity, maintains 
that the name “Republic of China” should be kept because it is part of history. When he 
was asked whether he thought Taiwan should cancel its name “Republic of China,” he 
answered:
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Let me see. Only Taiwan, without “Republic of China.” If there is no 
“Republic of China,” then we need to change our flag, because our 
national flag was the Kuomintang’s party flag when they relocated to 
Taiwan. Chiang Ching-kuo changed it to our national flag. Indeed, we do 
not have a real national flag, if you understand what I mean. Our national 
flag is the Kuomintang’s flag-changed. If you see a movie, you’ll see the 
flag then belonged to the Kuomintang. If you want to replace “Republic of 
China,” we would have to change our flag too. So I don’t think it 
necessary. We could just keep it. It has always been ours, and it is part of 
history. So we really don’t need to change it. (Kuan-ting) 46
The historical consideration is also Chun-chiao’s reason to keep the Republic of 
China, despite not thinking she was Chinese:
I know Taiwan will be convenient. Thus, so far, it's impossible to change 
Republic of China. But maybe in ten years, twenty years? Maybe we'll 
show "Taiwan" only. And Republic of China is the name we used a long 
long time ago in the UN, so I think Republic of China, the name is kept as 
old things, but not to represent the current usage. (Chun-chiao)
In conclusion, there are two layers of independence: administrative independence, 
which means Taiwan’s Republic of China’s autonomous administration without 
interference of another government; and ethnic independence, which means a free-
standing Taiwanese ethnicity. Interviewees displayed consensus over the existence of 
Taiwan’s political independence, but hardly agreed with one another on an independent 
Taiwan’s ethnicity. However, although they are confident that Taiwan now is enjoying 
democratic political autonomy without the interference of any other government, their 
confidence is far from carefree when it gets to the PRC government’s claim of threat of 
unification claim.
2b. Unification
In this section, the unification issue discussed is of a political nature. It is pertinent to 
Taiwan’s administrative independence. 
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• Why Not Unification?
Consistent with the finding that a Taiwanese national identity has emerged, my 
interviewees generally did not want a unification between Taiwan and China. Among 
fifteen interviewees, thirteen explicitly said they would like complete, official 
independence. Only one student said he would like Taiwan to merge with China, while 
another student was ambiguous.
The first reason mentioned for not wanting unification was the perception that China 
has a corrupted government. Several interviewees’ parents worked in China. Hsiu-ying, 
whose father used to run factories on the continent, said his father “was not happy” with 
his business experience, “because he had fulfilled all government requirements, and the 
government ate its words, denying him.” 47 Hung-yang, whose parents also worked in 
China, talked about the experience that his parents had with having to bribe the PRC’s 
government officials in order to get authorization, saying, “Very frequently, we had to 
bribe officials, no matter how low-ranking they were. We even had to bribe secretaries. 
48” His family’s unpleasant experience precluded his willingness to merge with the PRC 
government. He did not hesitate to show his aversion to the mainland Chinese 
government with harsh words:
If it is merger with China, I do not refuse it. But with the Chinese 
government, its political system, in my opinion, is filthy, is quite unclean. 
I’ve always been feeling horrible about it, and I don’t like it. Especially 
their culture, the culture of bribery, of corruption, makes me sick. I have 
no idea how long such a country can last if it goes this way. Only because 
your Chinese government is communist, although I do not see any 
difference between your communism and our republic. But economically 
speaking, there seems no difference between communism and our 
democracy. Just don’t be like South Korea and North Korean, that’s ok. 
But if the Chinese government goes on like this, I feel terrible. That’s why 
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I do not want to be merged with Chinese government. But I’m fine with 
merging with the Chinese people. 49
Shih-han’s parents had the same issue. She said:
My parents complained with me about their business. They talked 
something very dark, and they told me about something.... Like business 
takes a lot of trouble, you need to clear all those relations, and you need 
lots of networking. It’s not very transparent. 50
The students’ second concern about unification is China’s lack of freedom. The 
interviewees refused to choose the PRC’s rule on Taiwan because they valued their 
freedom. Shu-fen, a law school student, was very clear about the importance of freedom 
of speech:
You don't have to ask me if I'm Taiwanese or Chinese. You can ask me do 
I want live the lifestyle just like China? I would say I don't want to live the 
lifestyle in China. Just because of the right of speech, the media. It's kind 
of sad. That's the value we cannot accept. It's better, it's more important 
thing for us. That's what I think distinguishes us. 
Li-hua talked about freedom of speech, too. She made a comparison between Hong 
Kong and Taiwan:
I think now mainland China is still communist, and Taiwan is free and 
democratic. Thus I do not agree some of their policies... For example 
mainland China blocks circulation of many kinds of news... I’m not sure 
what Hong Kong is like now, but I do not want Taiwan to be the second 
Hong Kong. 51
The “One Country, Two System” model initiated by the PRC government does not 
appeal to Shih-han either. Like Li-hua, she does not trust in the PRC government’s 
freedom guarantee:
I don’t think the “One Country, Two Systems” approach in Hong Kong 
and Macau would work, because I heard from my Hong Kong friends that 
their textbook was modified. 52
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She also elaborated what freedom meant when asked why she did not want to merge 
with China: “Freedom of speech for the most part. I hope I can vote, and I want 
transparency. I want to know what my government is doing, and I can have a say in what 
my kids want to do.” 53
• Democracy as Basis of Unification
Since the political situation in China is a major concern for my interviewees, some of 
them said they would not rule out the possibility to merge with China, if the Chinese 
government becomes democratic. Tsai-chieh, when asked if she accepted being part of 
China, she said, “I will not refuse if China becomes democratic.” Po-jui agreed with Tsai-
chieh’s view, but he went further, saying that as a Chinese-speaking country, Taiwan 
shared the responsibility to help China democratize:
I think though they are separated, they will possibly be united in the future 
one day. However, I do hope it would be good for people, on both sides, if 
mainland China can learn something about democracy, though I don’t 
think Taiwanese democracy is really good enough for mainland China to 
learn. But there is something to learn. 
He went on saying: “I can accept it if my country changes its name or is united with 
the other country some day, as long as the whole process is democratic and legitimate.”
Yu-lan did not so readily accept the scenario that Taiwan would merge with China. 
Of course I think Taiwan is now a country. It is a fact. This is my first 
point. The second point, if Taiwan really ends up being merged with 
mainland China, then what we could only do is accept it, because we have 
no other option anyway. But we need really to agree with mainland 
China’s political principles if that is really what’s going to happen. 54
Quotes about China’s democracy as a premise for unification are limited, because 
most of my interviewees do not wish to merge with China, and for them, Chinese 
democracy is not an important issue. But as the world trend towards democracy 
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advances, a potentially democratic China not only benefits China-Taiwan relations but 
also contributes to a stable world order. Thus more study may be needed to measure 
Taiwanese citizens’ ideas about the development of democracy in their biggest neighbor 
country, and their co-destiny.
• Pragmatic Consideration
Although most interviewees rejected a unification with China, they were not eager to 
jump to a conclusion that severs all ties with it, because Taiwan needed to do business 
with the bustling Chinese economy. Hsiu-ying said, “The whole world depends on 
mainland China’s economy, thus we cannot be independent simply because we want to.” 
55 Hung-yang made his acknowledgement of the importance China’s economic 
cooperation with Taiwan. When he was asked whether Taiwan should declare official 
independence now and seek admission to the United Nations, he said:
If we can clear up all the confusion with China and can stop the argument 
about who we are, of course it’s good. But sometimes Taiwan would not 
feel like clearing up this confusion, probably out of an economic 
consideration. Because if you are still unclear about who you are, China 
would aid Taiwan. Or I would rather say China helps Taiwan, not aid. Just 
on economic terms, it would not see Taiwan break down. 56
A healthy relationship is considered vital to Taiwan, not only by those who view 
themselves as Chinese, but also by those who view themselves as exclusively Taiwanese. 
Chun-chiao rejected the notion that she was Chinese and advocated official Taiwanese 
independence. When she was asked if the Democratic Progressive Party was doing the 
right things by amplifying their voice on the agenda about Taiwan’s total separation from 
China, she answered:
Totally not! I admit that sometimes China has pressure, when it comes to 
Taiwan's issue. But I don't know. Taiwan has to be friendly with China, 
you know because China will be a powerful country after ten years, 
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twenty years, I don't know. We have connected, we share the same blood, 
you know. Because most people in Taiwan have moved from China from 
history. 
Similar to Chun-chiao, Kuan-ting views Taiwan-China friendship as beneficial to 
Taiwan as well as China. Despite that he thinks the Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou 
was going too far in maintaining a good relationship with China, it is to some extent 
necessary to maintain a positive tie between the two countries, as long as it is not 
detrimental to Taiwan’s political independence:
Undeniably, in terms of politics, we need your help in many ways, and you 
need our help in many ways. Because we have many businessmen in your 
country. If you break us down, our economy will suffer.... But we do not 
have to be so close. But recently I feel he (President Ma) has done some 
good things. For example, we have some criminal suspects who went to 
mainland China, and now mainland China can extradite them to us. I like 
that point. Of course if your criminal suspects come to our country, we can 
also arrest them and send them back.... So I think he’s done a good job in 
some agreements. But I still feel we need a distance. In my opinion, there 
should be a distance. 57
Li-hua was also slightly unhappy about President Ma’s Chinese policy, although she 
promoted cross-strait peace. When she was asked whether President Ma was being 
excessively soft with China, she said:
I think it’s all right to make friends, but you must adhere to your principle, 
which means you must show we are a country. I think friendship between 
the two countries, and world peace, they are necessary. But he was 
undermining Taiwan’ status. (Li-hua) 58
 As is seen from the quotes above, pragmatic considerations are a factor that renders 
the interviewees desirous of a stable cross-strait relation. A positive Taiwan-China 
relationship is seen as good for Taiwan in terms of economy and society. The wish for 
cross-strait friendship is held, regardless of whether one thinks oneself as Chinese or not. 
63
Yet an avid desire for peace between the two countries does not indicate that one wants 
Taiwan and China unified into one single country. 
2c. Future Solution
Most students were not ready to give an answer to the question about what would 
happen ultimately to Taiwan in the future. Chun-chiao’s answer is a representative 
response of most participants’ idea about a immediate solution. When she was asked if 
she thought Taiwan should declare independence now, she said “so far, no.”
Not only were they cautious about an immediate change of the current situation, 
interviewees were also largely hesitant to predict what would happen ultimately to 
Taiwan as the ultimate solution of its status as being de facto independent but not de jure 
independent. Among the fifteen students, nine did not specify an expectation about what 
would happen to Taiwan’s official status. Two students were optimistic that their country 
would finally achieve international recognition and join the United Nations as a nation-
state, while four were pessimistic.
• Ultimate Unification
Participants’ pessimism was mostly due to their knowledge about Taiwan’s domestic 
politics. Po-jui, a student majoring in political science, said although Taiwan and China 
“are separated, they will possibly be united in the future one day.” Asked whether he 
really thought they would merge in the future, he said: “Eventually I do, eventually. 
Especially when you see what Taiwanese government officials are doing sometimes, you 
don’t even dream Taiwan will be independent someday. I don’t think so.” 
He obviously gave a negative evaluation of Taiwanese government officials. I did not 
probe why he thought negatively about his country’s government, but his opinion could 
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be used as an example of how Taiwan’s internal politics can influence its foreign 
relations, including its relationship with China. Po-jui is not the only one disappointed in 
his government. Wei-sheng, a student who came to the United States two years ago, told 
me that he favored a politician named Lai Ching-te. But he thought it might take Dr. Lai 
quite a while to attract enough attention to win himself Taiwanese presidency, and Taiwan 
might well have been merged when Dr. Lai is able to stage campaigns. He said:
The chances that Taiwan will join China is 70%. It [will] still take Lai 
Ching-te some time (to gain nationwide popularity). It is possible that 
during this time, Taiwan is merged with China... Taiwanese people are 
going closer and closer to (China)... either for economic interest or for 
something else; they are more inclined to China. This situation is also 
reflected by votes. 59
Chih-ming did not think Taiwan would gain an official independent status within his 
life time: 
Independence, if it means changing the name of the country, changing the 
flag, and other signs, I don’t think it will ever happen while I’m still alive. 
It’s very difficult.60
• Ultimate Independence
But not all interviewees think Taiwan’s independent future is stark. Still some 
students envisioned a bright future where Taiwan will be an equal country to China. 
There are generally two reasons that account for their positive prediction.
One reason is that as older people die off, memories about mainland China are fading. 
Younger people who were born and grew up in Taiwan do not have such strong 
sentiments about China as their elders do. Shih-han expressed her view towards 
Taiwanese young people, with overseas Taiwanese students as her example:
I guess every overseas Taiwanese, like those you have interviewed so far, 
we all have the notion that we are a country. I think we, who are now 
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residing overseas, and people who are now living in Taiwan, we all know 
this is not going to be easy, but we will go on. (Shih-han) 61
Hung-yang similarly commented about future generations:
My feeling is that sooner or later, Taiwan will sever its historical tie with 
China. But now it seems [not realistic]... It appears everyone feels just fine 
with the status quo, and they are happy with the present situation. Because 
it (status quo) has been like this for well over fifty years, and it doesn’t 
seem to be a problem for another fifty years like this. Our next 
generation’s idea will again differ from ours, and Taiwan and China should 
be more independent from each other. 62
Another reason for optimism about Taiwan’s future independence is based on 
democracy. As mentioned in the preceding section, many students said they would not 
refuse unification with China if it became democratic one day. While this seems to be a 
conditional promise to the PRC government, democracy as a premise is actually a time 
delayer which could both maintain Taiwan’s de facto independent status quo, and help 
Taiwan gain final de jure independence when the time has come. Speaking about Chinese 
democracy as a precondition for Taiwan’s unification with it, Shu-fen says:
It's tricky. Someday if China becomes a democratic country, I don't think 
we can be the same country, because democracy is that, just like we could 
vote to decide, you have to follow the rule, but I cannot talk about the 
detail of law but I know that if you become a democratic country, we 
won't be together. It's because of the idea of democracy. Do you know 
what I'm talking about? ...I mean, if you become democratic country, then 
it's impossible for a reunion because it's democracy.....Yes. If there is self-
determination, 統一就不成立 (there is no ground for a reunification). So 
you ask people in Taiwan, can we be together? I believe that it won't 
happen. If you respect our opinion, that won't happen. 
Shu-fen was insightful about the value of democracy. Her idea will be specifically 
analyzed in the discussion part of this thesis.
• War and Peace
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Three interviewees mentioned the possibility of military confrontation between 
Taiwan and China, and considered war as a solution for Taiwan to get final official status 
in the world. Hsiu-ying said “independence will be achieved through a channel that is not 
peaceful.” 63  On the contrary, Shih-han said there would not be firearms involved in the 
sovereignty dispute:
I don’t think it will happen. I don’t think China dares to. When we held the 
presidential election [several years ago],  they had their missiles targeted 
at Taiwan. But I don’t think they will really do this, because other 
countries will speak up. 64
But after all, war is not a desirable solution to the sovereignty stand-off. Realizing 
this, it is easy to understand why not many interviewees brought up this topic. Chih-ming 
said the human race may need better ideas to tackle such a problem as is faced now by 
Taiwan and China. His idea about war and peace sums up this section:
A single nationality can form a single state easily; Various nationalities 
can also easily form a single state, but can one single nationality form two 
states? The human race’s wisdom is stuck here. Americans became 
American after their war with Britain, so they could say there were 
Americans, not British. Today we talk about Taiwan, you want Taiwanese 
independence, you want a flag, and all other symbols that distinguish you 
from China. Is the human race wise enough to think about this issue 
without resorting to force? I think Taiwanese independence advocates 
should think about this. If war is the only channel, military confrontation 
is the only channel, do you still support democracy? Do you still support 
independence? Many people do not want to think about this. 65
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Part 3. Living in America
The identity of most students interviewed underwent transformation after they started 
their study in the United States. For some of them, they came to feel more Taiwanese 
than they did when they lived in Taiwan, after they came to America and contrasted 
themselves sharply with the multi-cultural environment featured in their personal network 
and in American society. Also for some, they came to feel more Chinese than when they 
were in Taiwan, after they started to make friends with people from China, and realized 
there were more similarities than they used to think between Chinese and Taiwanese. 
These findings are discussed below.
3a. In a Multi-cultural Environment
In Findings, Part 1, it was mentioned that some participants complained that their 
country of origin was often mistaken for China, which upset them. But still, some 
students said Taiwan was relatively well known in the United States. Chia-hao said “after 
he studied in the United States,” he thought “Taiwan is greater than I thought in the 
United States.” Hung-yang also thinks so. He said: “In the United States, Taiwan is 
famous, which is normal, because after all, the US government supports Taiwan. There is 
a wide media coverage about Taiwan. But it might not be the case in other countries.” 66
Chia-hao and Hung-yang might not find many people sharing their idea about 
popularity of Taiwan in the United States. Interviewees more often than not complained 
that they were mistaken as Chinese instead of Taiwanese. A number of participants also 
said they were occasionally mistaken for people from Thailand, simply because Taiwan 
and Thailand sound alike.
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Living in the multi-cultural United States, Taiwanese students became more aware of 
where they came from and who they were, than they were before they left Taiwan for 
America. According to Kuan-ting, living in America augmented his Taiwanese identity:
In Taiwan my national identity was not so strong. Since you were in 
Taiwan, everyone was Taiwanese, you wouldn’t even talk about it. But in 
America, this issue is magnified. Here we talk about what we would not 
talk about in mainland China or Taiwan, and my national awareness was 
bolstered. 67
Residing in a foreign country, for Chun-hung, also helps overseas Taiwanese become 
more united:
Most of my friends would say once you are abroad, say in the US or 
Canada, we appreciate more where we come from, Taiwan, or think more 
about and care more about Taiwan. We are in a different country but we all 
come from Taiwan.
For Chia-hao, his study in America not only increases his national identity as 
Taiwanese, but also makes him more desirous of a complete independent Taiwan state, as 
compared to when he was living in his home country:
Before I studied the United States I wanted to keep the circumstances like 
they had been for, like fifty years. I don’t care. But after I studied in the 
United States, I think Taiwan is greater than I thought in the United States, 
so I think if we have the chance, and no one will attack us, I would like 
Taiwan be an independent country. After seeing a lot of differences outside 
Taiwan, I would like Taiwan to be an independent country. 
3b. Interaction with Chinese
Living in a multi-cultural environment can also potentially make people more aware 
of their home culture. On the other hand, living in such a complex environment also 
teaches people to respect various viewpoints, and be tolerant of ideas that are different 
from, or even opposite to, one’s own notions. Shih-han talked about her experience with 
her Chinese friends in the United States, saying:
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But looking from another view-point, you would not think it 
straightforward. They have their own ideas, we have our ideas, too. 
Because when I just arrived here, I was quite unhappy that they compared 
me to Chinese. I was Taiwanese. I have my own passport, and we have our 
constitution, so I tried to talk about it with my friends. But later I asked 
myself: why so serious? Now I still tell friends that I come from Taiwan 
and we are a country, letting them know about our position. If they insist 
Taiwan is part of China, I would still be unhappy, but I would not promote 
it too much. 68
Stories about conflicts over Taiwan’s status between Chinese and Taiwanese 
sometimes came up in the interviews. There were extreme cases where differences of 
ideas ended up evolving into physical attacks, or even fighting with weapons such as 
scissors. Kuan-ting’s Taiwanese identity was increased when he saw Taiwanese were 
bullied by the Chinese government and some people from China. He said: “Many times 
in the United States, when you see Taiwanese were treated badly by the Chinese 
government or by some insensitive Chinese, you would feel more Taiwanese.” 69
Although there were sad stories about incidents between students from China and 
students from Taiwan, there are rational people who have learned to listen to and talk 
about opposite ideas. Li-hua said she would avoid talking about hot topics such as her 
identity:
My Chinese friends and I would not talk about politics. It hurts to talk 
about it so we would simply ignore it, and stay away from this kind of 
topic. 70
Chun-hung was able to make a heated political topic a joke to make fun of:
My Chinese friends will say Taiwan belongs to us. We are just making fun 
of this. Not really an annoying thing. 
Stories are also told of some rational Chinese students who genuinely try to 
understand Taiwan’s situation. Li-hua talked about one of her friends:
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My [Chinese] friends like Taiwan, so there is not so much disagreement. 
My friends also think Taiwan is a country, different from China. One of 
my friends thinks Taiwan is so good, that he said Taiwan should declare 
independence as soon as possible. Once he was talking about this with an 
American, and their conversation was heard by another American. He said 
he had never heard a Chinese could talk about this so fiercely and 
seriously. 71
Actually, it should be easier for Chinese and Taiwanese to make friends with each 
other because they speak the same language. Just as Shih-han said:
[Before I left Taiwan] I thought maybe Chinese were different from us. 
But after I left Taiwan, I made friends with many Chinese, I feel we are 
the same. We are all hua ren, we all speak the Chinese language. 72
Kuan-ting also made friends with many Chinese. He thought that Chinese and 
Taiwanese should make friends with each other, although the two countries’ governments 
seemed to be deliberately stimulating Taiwanese-Chinese animosity:
In fact at times I feel it is the Chinese government which is being wicked, 
as well as the Taiwanese government. When I was in Seattle there were 
many Chinese studying in America. We all knew each other. We would 
think China is China, Taiwan is Taiwan. There should really be no 
confusion. They also thought the Chinese government was too naive. 73
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Chapter 5. Discussion
1. Identity
• Taiwanese National Identity and Chinese Cultural Identity
The participants’ accounts of who they thought they were clearly suggest that a 
Taiwanese identity has emerged. This Taiwanese identity was reflected in several ways. 
The first way is Taiwan’s geographical distinction from anywhere else in the world. 
Being a geographically isolated island, Taiwan was defined by its coastline, the area 
within which people from Taiwan call home. The second is Taiwan’s government, the 
Republic of China. The Republic of China functions on a completely autonomous basis. 
The president of this government is chosen through a general election every four years. 
The third way is culture. This factor is blurry because of culture’s pervasive nature. From 
what the interviewees said, Taiwanese culture includes lifestyle, participation in public 
affairs, social life, national character and language. 
According to Anthony Smith (1991), a nation consists of: [1]. A historic territory, or 
homeland, [2]. Common myths and historical memories, [3]. A common, mass public 
culture, [4]. Common legal rights and duties for all members, and [5]. A common 
economy with territorial mobility for members. Among the three aspects of Taiwanese 
national identity listed above, its land correspond with Smith’s concept of historical 
territory, or homeland (No.1), The Taiwanese government is correspondent with Smith’s 
factor No. 4 (common legal rights and duties for all members), and the cultural part is 
correspondent with Smith’s No. 3 (a common, mass public culture). In the interviews, 
participants also mentioned the importance of Taiwan’s economy. Thus their economic 
consideration is correspondent with Smith’s factor No. 5 (a common economy). 
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Now the only factor that seems in question is No.2. common myths and historical 
memories. Though not frequently discussed by my interviewees, Taiwanese people have 
their own common history that distinguishes them from any other group of people in the 
world. To cite Dreyer (2003),
The Polynesian cultures of the aboriginal tribes, occupations of varying 
lengths and degrees of intensity by the Spanish, Portuguese, and Dutch, 50 
years of colonization by an assimilationist Japan, and a period of strong 
American influence after World War II have all contributed to the 
development of distinct habits and mindsets of the Taiwanese people. 
Several decades of isolation from the mainland after 1949 also resulted in 
changes in the prevailing culture on Taiwan. Meanwhile, under the 
influence of Mao Zedong’s communist government, the culture of the 
mainland was changing as well, further widening the identity difference 
between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.
Thus Smith’s five factors are all satisfied with regard to the existence of a Taiwanese 
nation, based on which an independent Taiwanese national identity can be established.
That said, a Chinese factor nevertheless remains part of this Taiwanese national 
identity. First, the government that rules Taiwan, the Republic of China, has a Chinese 
origin and still names itself as China. Second, ancestors of many Taiwanese residents 
relocated from various Chinese provinces to Taiwan. Third, Taiwan’s official (and main) 
language is Chinese, and Taiwan’s written Chinese language is more traditional than that 
of China’s. These three facts can be categorized into Smith’s two factors: the history of 
government and the ancestry of residents are part of Taiwan’s common myths and 
historical memories, while the Chinese language is part of Taiwan’s public, mass culture.
A pie chart is drawn to delineate the relationship between the Taiwanese national 
identity, and its Chinese component:
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(Chart 4)
This whole pie stands for a general Taiwanese identity, which was held by all my 
interviewees. The pie was divided into five parts, each part standing for one of the five 
factors of the Taiwanese national identity, based on Smith’s definition of a nation. 
Although the five sectors look to have the same size, the importance of one certain factor 
within an individual’s national identity varies person by person.
Within the sector of history, a Chinese fraction remains one component of it. The 
same applies to the sector that represents culture. On the individual level, the size that is 
taken up by the Chinese factor also varies person by person. It can be as big as taking up 
the whole sector of history or culture, and can be as small as non-existent, which is the 
case for those students who maintained that they were exclusively Taiwanese. 
Thus two ideas are derived from the fifteen interviews:
1. On the social level, interviewees regard themselves as Taiwanese, and some but not 
all of them regard themselves as Chinese,
2. On the individual level, for one who thinks of oneself as Both Taiwanese and 
Chinese, the Chinese identity is confined within the cultural and historical divisions.
Economy
Government
Culture
History
Homeland
Taiwanese Identity
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The two factors indicate that an independent Taiwanese national identity has fully 
fromed, within which a Chinese factor remains a sub-identity.
• Taiwanese National Identity and Taiwanese Ethnicity
While a Taiwanese national identity has been achieved after the Republic of China’s 
several decades of nation-making, a Taiwanese ethnicity has not yet taken shape, at least 
not completely.
In the Findings section of this thesis, it was mentioned that several interviewees 
defined “Chinese” as Chinese-speaking. If we adopt the language-based ethnicity 
definition, all Taiwanese fall into the definition of ethnically Chinese, though this term 
was rejected by some participants. Also, the question about whether an interviewee thinks 
of him/herself as Chinese was presented in English in all fifteen interviews, thus among 
those who denied the English term “Chinese,” some might still accept that they are 
ethnically Chinese (hua ren), although this guess has to be confirmed by follow-up 
studies.
Among those students who accepted that they were Chinese, their acceptance of this 
term was just on the ethnic ground. When they were asked whether they were hua ren or 
not, some said they were, citing that hua ren means Chinese-speaking people. For them, 
their ethnicity was still embedded in the Chinese ethnic background. Thus the conclusion 
is that a free-standing Taiwanese ethnicity has not yet completely formed. 
However, lack of a Taiwanese ethnicity does not preclude the formation of a 
Taiwanese national identity. As Smith observed in his book, a new nation can form with 
or without a new ethnicity. The coming-into-being of a new nation without a new 
ethnicity is not unprecedented in history. The United States became a new nation after its 
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Independence War with Great Britain. Before the war broke out, the Americans were 
immigrants or descendants of immigrants who came from Europe. They were still 
maintaining their home culture. After the war, the United States of America came into 
existence. The creation of the new nation was in fact a pre-condition of an American 
ethnicity. Nowadays Americans generally refer to themselves as Americans, and seldom 
think of their European ancestry unless specifically asked about it. 
This scenario also applies to Taiwan. While Taiwan is developing its diplomatic ties 
with foreign countries and promoting its international recognition, the reputation of a 
Taiwanese nation is on the rise. Along with the expansion of Taiwan’s regional and global 
influence, Taiwanese people’s awareness of their own country is becoming stronger and 
stronger. Moreover, with older people who immigrated from China dying out in 
Taiwanese society, and with more and more Taiwan-born people entering, memories 
about their Chinese ancestry were gradually fading away. The classification about 
provinces of origin, Islanders (bensheng ren) and Mainlanders (waisheng ren) no longer 
applies to my interviewees. Indeed many of them told their grandparents’ story of either 
coming to Taiwan with the Kuomintang government when the Communist Party took 
power, or staying in Taiwan already before the Kuomintang’s retreat to Taiwan. They also 
knew clearly whether their grandparents were Islanders or Mainlanders. But the effect of 
Mainlander/Islander dichotomy does not have such a strong impact on the identification 
of the Taiwanese students I interviewed, who are in their 20s or 30s. Their generation is 
almost all born and raised in Taiwan, thus the dichotomy of Mainlander/Islander for them 
is not as meaningful as it was for their grandparents. The interviews confirmed that their 
identity with mainland China is not so affected by the place of origin of their 
76
grandparents. Largely growing up and receiving education in the post-democratization 
era of Taiwan, the younger generation have access to freedom of speech, and formed their 
identity based on their own experience with Taiwan. This is perhaps why their identity is 
less influenced by the place of origin than was the case for their parents and grandparents. 
This inter-generational trend is consistent with the survey result collected by the Election 
Study Center of National Chengchi University (Election Study Center 2012), which 
indicated that older generations had a stronger identity with China than the young people 
did.
In accordance with Smith’s statement that an ethnicity is not primordial, If the 
Taiwanese status quo continues for enough time, a Taiwanese ethnicity will ultimately 
come into being, replacing the notion of the Chinese ethnicity that is still prevalent 
among Taiwanese citizens.
• Taiwanese: Who They Think They Are
As shown in Chart 2, Wong and Sun (1998) identified five political positions about 
Taiwanese’s national identity on a continuum. The continuum of national identity held by 
Taiwanese is shown in the following schema:
(Chart 2)
Wong and Sun’s continuum consists of five sections. The left direction represents a 
stronger Chinese sentiment, and the right direction represents a stronger Taiwanese 
sentiment.
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My interviews with the Taiwanese students show a discrepancy from what Wong and 
Sun hypothesized. All the interviewees think they are Taiwanese. Though some of them 
also think they are Chinese, their sense of being Chinese is solely a cultural complex, and 
not a socio-political attachment. Thus, “Chinese nationalism” is not reflected in my 
interviews. The strong Taiwanese sentiment displayed by my interviewees indicate that 
they want their country to be a real country sooner or later, and wish that the status quo 
be gone some day. Thus the status-quoism does not apply to the findings of my thesis.
Although some of the participants report a double identity, i.e. Taiwanese as the main 
identity and Chinese as the cultural aspect, they are by no means confused. All of them 
clearly said they were Taiwanese. Thus the “confused identity” also fails to be reflected 
by my study.
Most participants fall into the two categories, Taiwanese-prioritism and Taiwanese-
nationalism. Both the two categories represent a preference for prioritizing Taiwan’s own 
interest. The difference between Taiwanese-prioritism and Taiwanese-nationalism is, 
according to Wong and Sun, that the former maintains Taiwan’s interests and right of 
self-determination, but does not rule out the possibility of merging with China, while the 
latter expressly calls for an independent country of Taiwan. As is expressed in the fifteen 
interviews, all participants clearly said that they were Taiwanese and wished for the best 
for their country. The inherent difference among them is that some students said they 
would accept a conditional unification resolution with China when the latter learned to be 
democratic, while others decisively said they would push for complete independence. In 
other words, of the five categories presented by Wong and Sun, only the two Taiwanese-
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oriented categories are reflected by my study, and none of the Chinese-oriented 
categories, not even the ambiguous one, applies.
2. Independence versus Unification
• Political Independence
The political independence of Taiwan is not a question to talk about. Since Taiwan is 
in fact functioning as an autonomous state, students have reached a consensus that their 
country is indeed an independent one, with little foreign intervention, including Chinese 
intervention. They are assured on the point by the fact that the two governments on either 
side of the Taiwan Strait function on an autonomous basis, with neither side exerting 
political power over the other. Given the condition that the two governments are now 
treating each other as partners practically though not nominally, most interviewees are 
confident in the possibility of protecting political independence of Taiwan from mainland 
China. Although Taiwan and mainland China depend on and cooperate with each other in 
numerous pragmatic aspects, these aspects nevertheless do not pose a threat to the 
democratic functionality of the government in Taiwan. On the contrary, administrative 
cooperation between Taiwan and mainland China benefits both parties, thus some of my 
interviewees are happy about the friendliness.
• Ethnic Independence
A Taiwanese ethnicity is in the process of formation. For some of my interviewees, 
political independence of Taiwan is not a problem. What they are really concerned about, 
is finding a free-standing position for Taiwan, as opposed to being entangled by the 
history of the Republic of China.
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The Republic of China claims the territory controlled by the People’s Republic of 
China as its part. That is to say, both mainland China and Taiwan are components of the 
Republic of China. However, due to the fact that the PRC has already established a stable 
regime in mainland China, this claim is no more realistic than the PRC’s claim on 
Taiwan. Talking about different viewpoints held by Taiwanese on their independence, 
interviewees suggested that independence has two meanings, a political one and an ethnic 
one. They are not concerned with the interference from the PRC in the administration of 
Taiwan. Instead, they advocate that Taiwan be independent from the Republic of China, 
and remove the name “Republic of China.” In this way, the tie between Taiwan and China 
is indefinitely severed.
The removal of “Republic of China” is a symbol of ethnic independence, which was 
supported by eight interviewees. They gave different grounds for a change of the name of 
their country from Republic of China to Taiwan. For most of them, the removal of ROC 
is purely out of pragmatic consideration. Since China has been widely accepted by the 
international community as the name of the PRC-controlled mainland China, the use of 
the Republic of China as the name of the government controlling Taiwan is confusing. 
Elimination of ROC from the name of the country would enhance the international 
recognition of Taiwan. 
Others advocate removal of “ROC” based on an in-depth ground. They say that 
Taiwan is not only the name of an island, but also has evolved into a name of a 
population. Although a good proportion of Taiwanese residents’ ancestors are from 
mainland China, and although Taiwanese people speak Mandarin Chinese, they 
nevertheless have been living in Taiwan from over half a century to as long as several 
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centuries. The geographical division between Taiwan and mainland China creates cross-
strait variations in numerous respects, and a Taiwanese ethnicity has already formed, 
according to some of my interviewees. 
On the point of accepting or rejecting being Chinese, and the preference to keep or 
remove “Republic of China,” this chart is used to explain the four categories of 
viewpoints:
(Chart 5)
As explained in the Findings Part 2, a person who rejects being Chinese may want to 
keep “Republic of China” (depicted by zone 2). This kind of preference is motivated by 
historical consideration. Citing that the name “Republic of China” has always belonged 
to them, some Taiwanese students value the historical significance conveyed by this 
name, despite not regarding themselves as Chinese. A person who self-identifies as 
Chinese and wants to keep the “ROC” (depicted by zone 1) may want to do so for ethnic 
reasons, for historical reasons, or both.
Oppositely, a person who regards him/herself as Chinese may want to remove the 
name “ROC” (depicted by zone 4) just for pragmatic reasons, so that if Taiwan is called 
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just “Taiwan,” it would be more recognizable for non-Chinese speaking people from 
other parts of the world. Likewise, a person who rejects being Chinese wants to remove 
“ROC” as well for ethnic reasons, or for the aforementioned pragmatic consideration, or 
both. As displayed in Table 3, there does not seem to be a correlation between 
interviewees’ acceptance of being Chinese and their preference to remove the “ROC” 
from the state name. 
• Political Unification with Mainland China
Now that the Republic of China has been ruling Taiwan for nearly seven decades, the 
justifiability of the ROC in Taiwan is out of question. Moreover, the democratization that 
occurred in the 1990s allowed Taiwanese residents to choose their government with the 
vote, and at the same time substantiated the legitimacy of the power of the government of 
the ROC.
Few interviewees find appealing the People’s Republic China’s claim on Taiwan, or 
its proposed “Unification with the Homeland.” During the interviews, the Taiwanese 
students frequently expressed their concern for the condition of mainland China. Among 
various topics that arouse concern, the most frequently discussed are government 
corruption, lack of freedom and lack of democracy. The interviewees talked about their 
parents’ bribery experiences as business people in China when dealing with mainland 
Chinese officials. They also expressed their dismay at not being able to use the Internet 
freely when they visited mainland China. Several interviewees gave specific examples 
about how the PRC government created social chaos (e.g., the Cultural Revolution) and 
mistreated dissenting ideas. About cross-strait cooperation, many of my interviewees 
mentioned the economic development of mainland China, and quite a few of them 
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regarded it important for Taiwan to maintain a good relationship with China in terms of 
non-political issues, such as economy, transportation and cultural exchange. They were 
quite philosophical on the point that a good Taiwan-mainland China relationship is 
beneficial to both sides. (One interviewee said trade with mainland China is vital to the 
existence of Taiwan.) But support of a friendly relationship between Taiwan and China 
does not expand to an embrace of the idea of a merger. On the contrary, it is just because 
the PRC government has a stained human rights record and a bustling industry that my 
interviewees felt that it may be threatening or dangerous if Taiwan merged with the PRC, 
thus preferred to keep a safe distance from it.
When foreseeing Taiwan’s future, the Taiwanese students were largely optimistic that 
Taiwan will finally declare official independence and join the United Nations as a 
member state. Most of them indicated that the status quo would continue, and the de facto 
independence will evolve into de jure independence. But their optimism is not carefree. 
Firstly, they did not think Taiwan should declare independence right away. This is due to 
both the pressure that the PRC put on Taiwan, and the pro-China stance that President Ma 
takes as the head of the state. Second, they did not specify a foreseeable time when 
Taiwan could do so. Third, some of my interviewees did not rule out the possibility that 
Taiwan would merge with mainland China. Several participants indicated that if the PRC 
is democratized and Taiwan has the right to decide its own fate, that they would not 
refuse a unified outcome. Among those who hold democracy as a premise for unification 
with mainland China, many expressed doubt and concern when they talked about the 
administrative model that was applied to Hong Kong. Some said that the compromising 
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of to Hong Kong’s democracy is a negative example for Taiwan, and they did not accept 
a Hong Kong-style arrangement with the PRC.
However, although the Taiwanese interviewees rejected the idea of merging with the 
People’s Republic of China for its poor understanding of human rights and democracy, 
some felt that Taiwanwould not merge with China even when China is democratized, 
because the democratic new Chinese government will understand and respect Taiwan’s 
position. In this light, the PRC’s so-called “Taiwan issue” is actually mainland China’s 
democracy issue itself. It is exactly because the PRC does not understand the value of 
democracy and cultural diversity that it relentlessly claims Taiwan as its own, like it 
claims Tibet. For this reason, the “Taiwan issue” will not be a permanent problem. It may 
automatically resolve upon China’s democratization. When totalitarianism falls apart, and 
a new democratic Chinese government is established, the expectation is that the new 
Chinese government will either: 1. find so many similarities and common viewpoints 
with the Taiwanese government that the two governments will start negotiation about a 
unification solution that is not detrimental to the rights of either Taiwanese or mainland 
Chinese, or: 2. feel just fine with an independent Taiwan and make friends with it, no 
longer caring about whether Taiwan should belong to China or should be independent.
An overview of the transcripts of the interviews shows taciturnity. When discussing 
unification, my interviewees subconsciously assumed solutions that are dominated, or at 
least initiated by the government of the PRC. It seems that their imagined unification will 
happen (if it will at all) with mainland China’s government taking the leading role, and 
the government in Taiwan either accepts or refuses. In the minds of most of my 
interviewees, “unification” means the annexation of Taiwan by the PRC government, 
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instead of the annexation of mainland China by the ROC government. The 
subconsciously assumed subordinate role reflects the comparison of power between the 
PRC-controlled mainland China and the ROC-controlled Taiwan.
3. Multi-Cultural Experience
Interviewees’ living experience in America leads them to a stronger identity of being 
Taiwanese. Exposed to a multi-cultural environment, the Taiwanese students became 
more aware of who they are than they were when in Taiwan. The augmentation of the 
Taiwanese identity was due to the comparison between the Taiwanese self and other 
people. The difference between a Taiwanese student and his/her environment exposes 
him/her to the fact that he/she came from Taiwan, and bore a unique Taiwanese trait that 
is not characteristic of people from another country. The effect of being different is 
especially strong for a country which is not so widely accepted internationally as a 
nation-state. Having to explain to other people where they came from and that they are an 
independent country, made the interviewees feel that Taiwan is a country in need of more 
publicity or promotion, and made them more determined to strive for a wider recognition 
of their homeland. In this sense, Taiwanese students came to feel more like they are part 
of Taiwan.
A number of participants said that they did not know many Chinese people when they 
were in Taiwan, and that they started making friends with Chinese only after they started 
living in America. Taiwanese students’ interaction with Chinese pushes Taiwanese 
identity in two directions. On one hand, Taiwanese students noticed that there were 
differences between themselves and Chinese. The differences lie in personality, accents, 
written languages, political viewpoints, among others. They may also notice that Chinese 
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students treated Taiwanese people in a way different from Chinese from a different 
Chinese province. The taciturn cleft between Chinese and Taiwanese might remind 
Taiwanese of the fact that Taiwan and China are two different countries. The 
enhancement of the Taiwanese identity is especially boosted when a Taiwanese student 
meets a Chinese who harbors antagonism against Taiwanese students’ sense of national 
independence. For example, one participant talked about a conflict between a Taiwanese 
student and a Chinese student, the latter becoming furious when hearing the former 
saying Taiwan was not part of China. In cases like this one, enmity between people from 
the two countries significantly encouraged an invigoration of the Taiwanese student’s 
sense of being Taiwanese.
On the other hand, Taiwanese students’ interaction with Chinese might also 
strengthen their Chinese cultural identity. Here Chinese does not only refer to people 
from China, but also includes Chinese-speaking people from other countries, such as 
Singapore, Malaysia, and some U.S. citizens. In other words, Chinese here denotes the 
Chinese ethnicity. Sharing a language with people from other countries might integrate 
Taiwanese students into a worldwide Chinese community, raising Taiwanese students’ 
awareness as of Chinese ethnicity (hua ren) around the world.
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Chapter 6. Conclusion
1. Identity
This study reveals that a Taiwanese national identity has fully formed. This Taiwanese 
identity is multi-faceted. Students perceive themselves primarily (and for some of them, 
exclusively) as Taiwanese based on five elements: [1] As a geographical entity, Taiwan is 
distinctively identified as an island located in East Asia, and it is not confused with 
anything other than the island. [2] Taiwan has its unique history (as any other country 
does), and Taiwanese people share the memory of what has happened in the past on this 
island. Although Taiwanese history is intertwined with, and sometimes parallel with that 
of other countries, such as Japan and China, it nevertheless has a different past as a whole 
when compared with other countries. [3] Taiwanese culture is different from that in other 
parts of the world. Like Taiwanese history, Taiwanese culture is influenced by other 
countries’ culture. But it has features that are not found anywhere else in the world. [4] 
Taiwan has an independent functioning government, which is called the Republic of 
China. The ROC controls Taiwan (and peripheral islands around Taiwan), and Taiwan is 
controlled only by the ROC. [5] Taiwanese people are concerned with the national 
interest of Taiwan. They feel they are part of the economic community of Taiwan.
The study also indicates that a Chinese cultural identity is part of the Taiwanese 
identity. First, the Taiwanese government’s official name is “Republic of China,” which is 
a conspicuous reminder of Taiwan’s historical and cultural link with China. Second, 
many Taiwanese are descendants of people who came to Taiwan from China earlier some 
time. Their ancestry is traced back to China. Third, the official (and widely used) 
language in Taiwan is Chinese. The Chinese language in Taiwan is even more traditional 
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than the Chinese language in China. All these indicators show that Taiwanese has a 
cultural identification of being Chinese. However, this Chinese identity is just one 
component of their Taiwanese identity. There are three reasons for the subordination. 
First, all Taiwanese students clearly stated that they are Taiwanese, but not all of them 
said they are Chinese. Second, the Taiwanese identity is multifaceted, while the Chinese 
identity is constituted only by cultural and historical factors. 
Some interviewees displayed a dichotomy in their identity. Their national identity is 
split into two parts: socio-political and cultural. The socio-political identity is Taiwanese, 
while the cultural identity is Chinese. This is an alternative explanation of the fact that 
their Chinese identity is confined to the cultural sphere, and does not have anything to do 
with China as a political entity, i.e. the PRC. Moreover, because the communist regime in 
China has “revolutionized” culture in China so much, that the “Chinese culture” in China 
is much different from that in Taiwan. Thus the fact that Taiwan is culturally Chinese 
actually makes Taiwan socio-politically non-Chinese, i.e. non-PRC. In other words, 
Taiwanese may accept that they are hua ren, but they would reject that they are zhong 
guo ren.
2. Independence Versus Unification
• Administrative
All interviewees realized that their country has an autonomously functioning 
government, thus Taiwan is an independent country. They have reached a consensus that 
their country is not part of any other country, and most of them wish eventual official 
independence for Taiwan in the future. As for the unification with China, most Taiwanese 
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show strong opposition, or at least indifference. The reason why they do not think 
unification is desirable is that they think China is not a democratic country. Some 
Taiwanese students used Hong Kong as a negative example of a formerly free region 
being put under the totalitarian control of China even if it had been promised a “two-
system” arrangement. Among those students who indicated that they would not want to 
merge with China, some say that if China becomes democratic one day, they would think 
about unification. But as one interviewee pointed out, democratization of China would 
not necessarily result in merger of Taiwan and China because when China is a 
democracy, it will learn to respect the choice of the Taiwanese people, thus will not 
execute a unification of Taiwan, when Taiwan will have been independent for several 
decades.
• Ethnic
Not all interviewees agreed that a Taiwanese ethnicity has emerged. Many of them 
still think Taiwanese are ethnically Chinese. Nor do all of them think it necessary to 
remove “China” from Taiwan’s state name (Republic of China).
It should be noted that support of the removal of “ROC” from the state name does not 
come hand in hand with an identification of a Taiwanese ethnicity. There are students 
who think they are ethnically Chinese but want to remove “ROC”, and there are also 
students who think they are ethnically Taiwanese but still want to keep the “ROC” as the 
name of the Taiwanese government.
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3. Living in America
Taiwanese students’ experience of living in the US affects their national identity. 
Since the US is a multi-cultural country, the interviewees have the opportunity to meet 
people from all over the world. They have the chance to compare Taiwan to other 
countries and find out that Taiwan is perceived as a different country from any other 
country. They also noticed that there are differences between people from Taiwan and 
people from China. Thus the interviewees’ Taiwanese national identity was strengthened 
by their experience of living in America.
At the same time, some Taiwanese students make friends with people from China. 
They were able to get along and interact with each other. They speak the same language 
and even found many common points in their respective home culture and their 
personality. As a result, they concluded that differences between Taiwanese and Chinese 
are not that big, thus their Chinese cultural identity was increased by interaction with 
Chinese.
Taiwan is not officially recognized as a country by many countries in the world. As a 
result, many people in the United States do not think Taiwan is a country. These include 
people who were born and grew up in America, and who came to America as foreigners, 
including people from China. The interviewees have the opportunity to meet those people 
who do not think their country is really a country. The confrontation of opposite 
viewpoints on one hand stimulates Taiwanese students’ national awareness and make 
them feel more Taiwanese. On the other hand, the encounter of opposite ideas also makes 
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them realize that not all people agree with them, thus they are more tolerant than different 
attitudes about their country.
4. Study Limitations and Recommendations for Further Study
This study is not a quantitative study, and the sampling is not a random sample. 
Certain crucial groups of people were missing in the sample: none of the fifteen 
interviewees belongs to the Taiwanese Aboriginal Peoples. All of the fifteen interviewees 
came from the Taiwan island, and nobody from Kinmen, Matsu or Penghu (all peripheral 
islands around Taiwan) was interviewed. The study result would be more generalizable if 
future studies could employ random sampling among all Taiwanese residents.
Interviews that are conducted in the English language probably have lost some 
nuances. Translation between Chinese and English failed to preserve all nuances that 
were originally expressed. For example, the Chinese terms zhong guo ren and hua ren are 
simply translated into one English term, “Chinese.” As a result, Chinese-speaking readers 
can be confused when they read: Cheng-han rejects the notion of being Chinese, because 
they have difficulty understanding whether the English term “Chinese” is in the socio-
political meaning, or in the cultural meaning. Future researchers are advised to make 
clear the meanings of two terms, and to make note of nuances that might be lost due to 
translation.
Because the study was conducted entirely in the United States, it might not reflect the 
true identity held by Taiwanese who live in Taiwan. US-living Taiwanese have had some 
life experiences that are not shared with their domestic compatriots, thus their national 
identity might have evolved during their stay in America. Caution is needed when trying 
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to generalize the study’s conclusions to all Taiwanese people. Future researchers would 
have a better basis for generalizing about Taiwanese people if they conduct such a 
research project in Taiwan.
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Glossary
Names that are in italic are romanized in pinyin. Names that are in regular font are 
romanized in Wade-Giles. Names that are underscored are neither pinyin nor Wade-Giles, 
but are customarily or officially romanized.
Anping: 安平
Association for Relations Across the Taiwan 
Straits: abbreviated as ARSTS, 海峽兩岸
關係協會
Beijing: 北京
bensheng ren: Islanders, 本省人
Changhua: 彰化
Cheng Ch’eng-kung: also known as Koxinga, 
鄭成功
Cheng Chih-lung: 鄭芝龍
Chiang Ching-kuo: 蔣經國
Chiang Kai-shek: 蔣介石
Chinese Communist Party: acronym CCP, 中
國共產黨
Dachen Islands: 大陳群島
Diaoyutai Islands: 釣魚臺列嶼. Japanese 
name: Senkaku Shotō
hua ren: 華人
Kinmen: also known as Quemoy, 金門
Koxinga: same as Cheng Ch’eng-kung, 國姓
爺
Kuomintang: Chinese Nationalistic Party, 中
國國民黨
Lai Ching-te: 賴清德
Lee Teng-hui: 李登輝
Lin Huixiang: 林惠祥
Matsu: 馬祖
Ma Ying-jeou: 馬英九
Mao Zedong: 毛澤東
Mei-li-tao Incident: 美麗島事件
Ming Dynasty: 明朝
Nanjing: 南京
Penghu Islands: 澎湖群島
Qing Dynasty: 清朝
Senkaku Shotō: Japanese name, 尖閣諸
島. Chinese name: Diaoyutai Islands
Shi Lang: 施琅
Straits Exchange Foundation: acronym 
SEF, 海峽交流基金會
Sun Yat-sen: 孫中山
Taichung: 臺中
Tainan: 臺南
Taipei: 臺北
Taiwan: 臺灣
Tamsui: 淡水
waisheng ren: Mainlanders, 外省
人!
Wu Fusheng: 吳福生!
Yijiangshan Islands: 一江山群島
yuan zhu min: Taiwanese Aboriginal 
Peoples, 原住民 
Zhejiang: 浙江
zhong guo ren: 中國人
Zhou Enlai: 周恩來
Zhu Yigui: 朱一貴
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Quotes in Chinese
Only conversations originally in the Chinese language are included in this section.
Duplicate quotes exist because one quote may be cited twice or more in the thesis.
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1 訪談者：所以你跟你的臺灣朋友相比就很少介意中國和臺灣之間關係的問題。
被訪者：應該是，我覺得對中國只是一種不爽，很難講說到底為什麼。
2 林冠廷：姐姐妹妹，比較沒有討論。也不是說沒有討論，因為我們的立足點都是一樣的，就是我
們知道我們是臺灣人，不是中國人。我們知道我們是在臺灣長大的。我們知道我們的護照是寫臺灣
⋯⋯當然我們也會討論，但是其實討論也不是說是討論，就是，尤其是我們理念都一樣，所以根本
就是附和，說對啊，我們不是大陸的啊，我們不是中國大陸的。我們就是臺灣。我說對啊，我們全
部想法都是一樣的。
3 張志明：憑國籍來定。憑A 本護照來定。憑很多的生活方式。因為會變得就是說，所謂法制的管
轄權在哪裡，就決定了你的區隔。
4 郭鴻陽：中國就是中國，與其說它是威脅臺灣，不如說它本來就是一個比臺灣大很多倍的國家。
另一方面是它認為臺灣是他們的。我覺得兩邊是很分開的事。
5 吳麗華：但是我們家的話，就是我爸爸媽媽跟我還有我弟，因為我們都有投票權。我們就覺得
說，臺灣就是一個國家。那我們選舉的時候就應該選對我們國家好的，就是把臺灣當作一個國家，
不是說為了準備要跟中國統一這樣的。
6 鄭春嬌：有一些，比如說，不一定是馬英九本人提出的，有可能是農委會。他們說，我們必須引
進美國牛，因為我們吃肉，不吃內臟。那樣那些化學藥物只存在于內臟。但是，他打進去如果存在
內臟，有可能不存在肉裡面嗎？所以臺灣人民尤其是民進黨那邊的人就會說為什麼馬英九這個要引
進美國牛的政策。他們是說，引進來沒有關係啊，我們可以同時顧有國民安全於外交政策。可是當
他提出外交政策的時候，很明顯他就是為了外交政策而不是為了那個國民健康。
7 劉詩涵：其實我覺得那是我們的，可是好像拿不回來。⋯⋯就跟我們在世界上的認可一樣。好像
是我們應該得到，但是很難。可是我們還會試吧，我們應該還會試。
8 林冠廷：三個鄰近國，臺灣也想要，中國也想要，日本也想要。所以有可能，我是覺得日本如果
這麼想要，中國也這麼想要，臺灣的話是，如果真的要打的話，我們是打不贏的啦。我們可能就，
就不要好了。我們乾脆不要，不要這樣子浪費我們的軍用資源，因為我們是不可能贏過這兩個國家
的。日本跟中國可能還有一個機會，我們的話一定是馬上就擺在後面了。以我對我們軍事、軍人來
講，我是對他們的瞭解，我是沒什麼信心啊。
9 黃秀英：在大陸受限太多了，什麼東西都會被管。你可能還會被監聽之類的。這不是一個自由的
國家。我們已經自由慣了，我們已經西化慣了。我們就覺得，你憑什麼管我們這麼多。像YouTube 
為什麼不能看，為什麼Facebook 不能用。就這些你會覺得，搞什麼？！我覺得可能這情況也導致
說，我覺得大陸人應該也不滿意這情況吧。
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10 吳麗華：人的話，我覺得文化好像還是有些不一樣。臺灣人還是比較含蓄，可能是因為接受了日
本的教育，我猜。接受過日本人教育所以可能會比中國人含蓄一點。中國人跟臺灣人比起來是很敢
講。我來這邊認識很多中國人，他們對我很友好，我是說就personality 方面，文化是有差。中國人
好像還是比較，我覺得，對我來說，跟我比起來，還是比較敢講，敢發表。
11 吳麗華：那我認識的中國女孩就比臺灣人強勢很多。Generally，幾乎都是這樣。還有就是中國女
生，說我不能這麼軟弱，就覺得我們臺灣女生太好講話了，比較服從之類的。我就覺得認識好多很
強勢的中國女生。尤其是女孩特別。
12 黃秀英： 臺灣一直處於被欺壓的狀況下，所以臺灣人會自卑，一直很自卑，覺得自己的文化什麼
的不好，然後就導致不太團結。然後就會比較崇洋媚外。臺灣人還蠻崇洋媚外的。你應該看得出
來。應該說，就像中國開始抵制日本，是因為釣魚臺的事件。可是像我們臺灣受到韓國欺壓也不
少，就是可能像跆拳道比賽，國際上比賽也會受韓國人影響。可是臺灣人就是沒辦法很團結，說我
們要抵制韓國用品之類之類的⋯⋯我覺得臺灣人是要比較進步的一個地方吧，真的要比較向內一
點。
13 張志明：比如說，你是在討論你的difference，你是深藍的偏綠的。我知道你是偏藍的，我知道你
是偏綠的，可是我們在同一個框框下面。在我看來，這個才是identity。然後臺灣能夠吃到好吃的東
西，哪裡吃到，臺南吃到好吃的東西，是只有這裡才吃得到的。這個才是比較有趣的identity。就是
我會比較像是那種Foucault，或者法國的那種生活很深沈的，很旁支末節，每天都routine 做的事
情，社會學，才會是。
14 劉詩涵：可是我個人覺得，從孫中山那個時候，就是這個中華民國。我們既然繼承了他的遺志，
我們就應該留著這個名字。我們可以說是中華民國在臺灣。
15 陳玉蘭：我當然認同說臺灣是一個國家，⋯⋯可是如果從歷史或者地理的觀點來看的話，臺灣它
代表的其實是一個地理名稱，可能不是一個國家名稱。如果你現在要把臺灣當成一個國家名稱的
話，就是你會需要證明，或者是從你的教育等等的開始。可是這就會是一個很大的革命。
16 我爺爺是在雲南長大的。我爺爺二十幾歲還是三十幾歲的時候就來臺灣了。他來臺灣快五十幾年
了。
17 鄭春嬌：我爸去過漳州。他有找到我們家的，就是姓鄭的，再往前的那一代。所以去年開始我們
家有族譜。所以我是漳州那邊過來的第七代或者第八代。
18 吳麗華：上面是寫，我姓吳。然後上面寫浙江。但是確實不知道是多久以前了。應該也來了好幾
代了。不是民國三十八年過來的。不是那個時候。
19 張志明：我是Chinese 啊。我覺得這個部分是你把Chinese 這個字要掛上什麼樣的意涵在裡面。沒
有辦法，因為英文用了一兩百年，Chinese 就是指⋯⋯
訪談者：Chinese speaking 的。
張志明：對啊。
20 劉詩涵：我們好像沒有特別成立機構耶。可是我們教的都是繁體字，我們會背四書五經，從小就
唐詩三百首，一路寫書法練下來，我覺得已經deep in our bones。
21 劉詩涵：我不覺得是不是正統耶。 我不覺得有什麼正不正統的那種notion。可是我覺得既然都這
樣下來了，那我們就延持這個傳統。就像我覺得寫繁體字，保留一些古文，如果是我們可以做的，
那麼我們就可以做好。
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22 吳麗華： 譬如說有人問我說是不是Chinese，我會說kind of, I’m from Taiwan。我還是會想說我是
從臺灣來的。那，就是這樣。還要講什麼。覺得政治上面差很多。但是其他部分⋯⋯因為我們用同
樣的語言，然後我們的文化其實也是從中國來的。所以就是，我不知道要怎麼講。
23 黃秀英：臺灣人的意識裡面就不會說我們是中國，說我們是臺灣，我們不是Chinese，我們是
Taiwanese 。
24 訪談者：那麼，do you think you are Chinese？
王偉勝：我會講Taiwanese。
25 訪談者： 那你覺不覺得你是Chinese？
陳玉蘭：Chinese 嗎？嗯，我還是會介紹我是Taiwanese。因為大部分，你在介紹人家說從哪裡來
的時候，當然還是會說I’m from Taiwan，然後理所當然你介紹你是Taiwanese 會比較符合自己的說
的。所以我個人會介紹我是Taiwanese。
訪談者：那如果有人問你，are you Chinese，你會回答yes 還是no，或者是別的什麼回答？
陳玉蘭：嗯，no。因為在一般人的觀點來說，China 還是中國大陸。
26 林冠廷：所以很多書有時候，有時候有些書是大陸作者寫的，我看著簡體字我看不懂。不是說一
個字都看不懂，很多字⋯⋯我基本上全部都看不懂。有些字我都是要猜的。看上面哪一個字然後猜
下一個字，就是這個意思。不然直接看，我不知道那個字是什麼。
27 劉詩涵：我希望我們還可以保持獨立，能寫我們的繁體字，然後能有我們的言論自由。我想這對
我們很重要。
28 吳麗華：他們講的話，一開始我有點聽不懂。有些詞還是聽不懂。但是現在漸漸地，慢慢知道。
我們實驗室就有個中國來的阿姨，她是technician。跟她講話有時候還是要想一下，大部分都聽得
懂。
29 吳麗華：政治方面，我覺得臺灣是一個國家。
30 訪談者：怎麼看中國？
王偉勝：怎麼看中國，就是另一個國家。
31 吳麗華：中國人，我覺得中國人，在中國大陸的人；華人的話，我會覺得只要說mandarin Chinese 
的都是華人。這是我自己的認知。
32 林冠廷：中國人和華人嗎？我覺得是有不一樣誒。中國人，當然最簡單就是中國大陸長大的。華
人是一個總稱。就像是American 跟White。American 是在美國長大，White 就是白人。那我們就是
華人，那你是中國人我是臺灣人。但是我們都是華人。你會講中文，可能在新加坡，也是華人，但
是他是新加坡的華人，是新加坡人，馬來西亞也是一樣。香港啊菲律賓⋯⋯在美國長大的華人，也
是Chinese American 或者Taiwanese American。但是是美國華人。所以中國人和華人是不一樣的。
33 郭鴻陽：不會說是中國，因為中國就是說你是大陸人的意思。如果說是華人，就一定是啊。但
是“中國人”⋯⋯如果是從文化的觀點上來看的話，我們都承認是中國人，因為我們文化基本上是一
樣的。所以你講你是中國人說中國話，我們說是啊，就文化上來說。但是如果你說從政治，就分辨
說你是臺灣人還是大陸人的時候，我們就會說自己是臺灣人。
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34 林冠廷：我覺得我是臺灣人。從小在臺灣長大，我拿的臺灣護照。對我自己認知，我覺得我是臺
灣人。雖然我知道我有家人是從中國來的，但是我是臺灣人。從小都在這個小的島上長大，然後，
對我的認知我就是臺灣人。然後我有臺灣護照。從小我念的是繁體字，我們好像是唯一一個目前為
止還用這麼傳統的繁體字。然後就是臺灣人。
35 郭鴻陽：我個人認為，只是個人認為，中國就是中國，與其說它是威脅臺灣，不如說它本來就是
一個比臺灣大很多倍的國家。另一方面是它認為臺灣是他們的。我覺得兩邊是很分開的事。
36 吳麗華：政治方面，我覺得臺灣是一個國家。
37 林冠廷：對我來講，這都是政治上面的問題。當然政治上面來講的話，很多時候，中國給臺灣壓
力很大，這都是全世界都知道的。但是對我來講，我是覺得，是還好。我是覺得還好。因為，不知
道怎麼講。井水不犯河水了。你們不會來弄我們，我們也不會怎麼樣。我們不去弄你們，你們也不
會怎麼樣。所以我覺得是⋯⋯但是政治方面來講一定有很大的壓力。
38 劉詩涵：我會覺得受到壓力，可是我覺得如果站在中國立場想，他們想要臺灣也是正常的。雖然
說是兩個國家，可是歷史以來他們是在一起的。所以站在不同的立場會有不同的想法。
39 王偉勝：大多還是覺得自己⋯⋯是中華民國，只是它的邊界比較有問題。那麼有一部分覺得是想
要獨立，或是說現在已經是獨立了。然後我是認為是，臺灣是需要獨立，可是不是獨立於中國大
陸，因為本來就不屬於中國大陸。是要獨立於中華民國。
訪談者：獨立於中華民國。
王偉勝：對對對。因為中華民國它本身的邊界就是很奇怪的。
訪談者：邊界很奇怪？
王偉勝：就是包括中國大陸啊。
40 訪談者：你現在覺得沒有一個叫做Taiwanese 的ethnicity？
張志明：我覺得他有。但是他是很斷裂的⋯⋯憑國籍來定。憑A 本護照來定。憑很多的生活方
式。因為會變得就是說，所謂法制的管轄權在哪裡，就決定了你的區隔。
41 陳玉蘭：我當然認同說臺灣是一個國家，⋯⋯可是如果從歷史或者地理的觀點來看的話，臺灣它
代表的其實是一個地理名稱，可能不是一個國家名稱。如果你現在要把臺灣當成一個國家名稱的
話，就是你會需要證明，或者是從你的教育等等的開始。可是這就會是一個很大的革命。
42 訪談者：那覺得臺灣應不應該取消“中華民國”這個名字？
劉詩涵：我不覺得應該取消，因為那本來就是我們的名字。
訪談者：因為我想它會confuse 很多人。會認為Taiwan 為什麼會是Republic of China。
劉詩涵：可是我個人覺得，從孫中山那個時候，就是這個中華民國。我們既然繼承了他的遺志，
我們就應該留著這個名字。我們可以說是中華民國在臺灣。
43 訪談者：那你覺不覺得應該把臺灣改名？ 改成臺灣，不要叫Republic of China 。
郭鴻陽：這點我倒是很贊成。因為你如果一天不改名⋯⋯因為中國一直因為這件事情在跟臺灣
吵。他們只承認一個中國啊，就我所知。然後我就想說，你何必要堅持自己是Republic of China？
為什麼不說是臺灣就好？我從小到大認知都是臺灣而已啊，才沒有管什麼中華民國這四個字。我反
而覺得很難用。而且碰到某些政治立場比較鮮明的同學，不管是中國的同學還是臺灣的同學，有些
話不能夠講得太白。就是你不可以很堅持地說你是中華民國，好像就冒犯到中國的同學，所以我不
喜歡這樣。與其這樣，還不如說是臺灣就好了。
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44 郭鴻陽：你想說自己是一個國家，但是名字上又牽扯不清。所以再看一下好了。而且你說
Republic of China，你去問世界上有哪幾個人知道那是什麼東西。搞不好人家只知道那是China 而
已。然後你如果說臺灣的話搞不好還比較容易。
45 吳麗華：我覺得應該（改名字）。就是你如果跟人家講，我們的護照上面還是寫了Republic of 
China。每次跟人家講都說我們是臺灣人，從臺灣來的。有時候會confuse 其他國家的人。所以覺得
應該要改。
46 林冠廷：我想想看啊，只有臺灣，沒有中華民國臺灣。那如果沒有中華民國，我們連國旗都要換
掉啦。因為我們的國旗是國民政府來的時候他們的黨旗。然後蔣經國把它變成國旗。真正來講，我
們是沒有真正的國旗，如果你這樣想的話。因為我們的國旗是那時候國民黨的黨旗，到時候變成國
旗。如果你自己去查，你看看電影，那個時候的國旗就是臺灣的國旗。如果你說把中華民國換掉，
那麼國旗都要換掉啦。 所以我覺得，應該沒什麼必要吧。我覺得留著就留著啊。反正都已經是我
們的，應該是歷史的一部分，這就是歷史而已啊，所以沒什麼必要。
47 黃秀英：我爸不是很開心。 因為政府要求的requirement 他都做到了，可是政府後來又反悔說你這
些不行這樣這樣的。
48 郭鴻陽：但是我父母他們就會覺得說，因為是臺商，所以大陸工作覺得大陸政府的欺負。
訪談者：欺負？我以為會優待呢。
郭鴻陽：你想太多。
訪談者：他們怎麼欺負臺灣人？
郭鴻陽：稅啊，要包紅包啊，諸如此類的。很多。再小的官都要包。好像是遞文件的人也要包。
49 郭鴻陽：如果你說跟中國融合，我沒意見。可是跟中國政府，它的政治體系一直讓我覺得很骯
臟，很不乾淨，一直給我感覺很差。我不喜歡。尤其是他們的文化，送紅包那種文化，貪污的文
化，讓我覺得很糟糕很噁心。所以如果一個國家再這樣搞下去，不知道還能夠撐多久。只是因為你
們中國政府是共產主義，雖然我現在看不出共產主義跟我們所謂的republic 有什麼不一樣，但是共
產主義跟民主主義現在看起來，就經濟上的觀點來說，好像沒有什麼差別。你只要不要像南韓和北
韓差那麼大就好了。但是如果中國政府再這樣子貪污下去，我覺得會很糟糕。所以不想跟中國政府
合一起。但是和中國人合在一起我覺得沒有關係。
50 劉詩涵：我爸媽也跟我們抱怨生意上的時候，有些事情很黑暗，然後他跟我們說一些有的沒的
事。⋯⋯像做生意很麻煩，就是你要一層一層去打通，然後可能要很多應酬。不是很透明。
51 吳麗華：我覺得應該是說中國大陸還是共產主義嘛，臺灣比較民主自由，所以譬如說有些他們的
政策就很不能認同。⋯⋯比如說你們就會和諧掉很多新聞之類的。⋯⋯我不清楚現在香港是什麼
樣，可是我也不希望臺灣變成第二個香港。
52 劉詩涵：我不覺得香港那種一國兩制或者澳門那種事情會work，因為後來我也聽一些香港的朋友
說，他們的教材還是有些被改變了。
53 訪談者：那麼你作為臺灣人，是怎麼看待中國這個國家，比如說它的政治？你覺得你不想跟它融
合的原因在哪裡？
劉詩涵：言論自由吧。很大一部分。然後我希望有選舉權，我希望透明，我希望我能知道我的政
府在做什麼，然後我能決定我以後的小孩想要做什麼事。
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54 陳玉蘭：就是我們認為臺灣就是（一個國家），因為本來，我們認為本來就是一個既定事實了。
所以這是第一點。那再來，如果說到最後真的要被中國大陸吸收了成為一部分，那如果那個時候，
就是我們是可以認同中國大陸的政治的話，那我想或許，反正不接受也不行。如果到最後真的走向
那樣子的方向。
55 黃秀英：應該說全世界的經濟都要靠大陸，所以沒辦法現在想獨立就獨立。
56 郭鴻陽：如果這樣子，和中國切得很乾淨，不用在那邊爭臺灣是誰的話，那當然好啊。但是臺灣
有時候會覺得說它不想跟中國切得那麼乾淨，可能是經濟上的關係，經濟上的考量。因為畢竟如果
你還是有一點曖昧的話，你再怎麼樣中國好像都會援助臺灣，某種程度上是幫助，不能說是援助。
就是經濟上的考量，它還是不讓臺灣垮掉。
57 林冠廷：無可否認，我們在政治上面來講，有些地方有很多東西要靠你們，有很多東西你們也要
靠我們。因為我們很多臺商在你們大陸。如果一下來我們全部都垮了。我們那邊經濟一定馬上下來
的。⋯⋯但是我覺得沒有必要這麼親近。但是很多，我覺得他（指馬英九總統）做了很多事都還不
錯。就像臺灣現在我們很多犯罪之後跑到大陸，那大陸現在可以抓人遣送回來。⋯⋯當然你們來了
我們地方，我們也可以抓了把你們遣送回去。所以很多其實，很多的也不是說條件，協議，我覺得
他做得還不錯。但是我覺得，還是要保持一定的距離。我自己覺得還是要保持一定的距離。
58 吳麗華：我覺得友好沒有關係。但是你必須適度，就是還是要讓他表示我們是一個國家。我覺得
兩國之間友好，世界和平嘛，是必要的。但是覺得，那麼委屈我們臺灣⋯⋯
59 王偉勝：70％ 的可能性會加入中國吧。因為賴清德還是要等，可是在等的期間，有可能就是被併
掉了。 ⋯⋯因為人民是也慢慢靠近，或者慢慢，對啊⋯⋯利益或者是之類的關係，就比較偏中國
了。⋯⋯從票數來看也是這樣的。
60 張志明：所謂獨立不獨立這件事情，如果一定要更改國號，更改國旗，這些一定要掛上等同的符
號才能成立的話，我覺得到我死之前可能都不會出現。很困難。
61 劉詩涵： 我覺得，出來的每一個人，我想至今你interview 到的，大家都還是很有我們是一個國家
的意向。可是我覺得我們出來的人，或者在臺灣的人，明明知道這條路不是很容易，可是我們還是
要堅持。
62 郭鴻陽：感覺上是總有一天會切斷呢，但是好像現在⋯⋯大家都覺得現在這樣子沒有什麼不好的
感覺，就這樣子就好啊。因為，現在怎麼說，也都過了五十年有了吧，再來個五十年好像也不是什
麼問題耶。我們之後的下一代，想法不一樣，應該會分得更開了吧。
63 黃秀英：會經過一個非常的不和平的方式來獨立。
64 訪談者：如果付諸武力呢？
劉詩涵： 我不覺得會走到那個地步。我不覺得中國敢，如果它⋯⋯那個時候選總統，有飛彈瞄准
臺灣。可是我不覺得他們會那麼做。因為其他國家會說話。
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65 張志明：單一的民族可以成立一個單一的國家，很簡單；那不同的民族可以成為一個國家，很簡
單；可是，單一的民族能不能成為不同兩個國家，人類的思維卡在這個部分。那，美國人是打了一
戰才⋯⋯所以他們可以說他們是Americans，不是British。那當然，那個是兩百年前的事情了。可是
問題是，人類有沒有進步，這兩百年有沒有學到lesson，能夠用更其他的角度去看這件事情。就會
變得就是說，講得難聽一點，今天要說Taiwanese，你要有Taiwanese 的自主權，你要把這個東西有
明顯的國旗，然後跟所謂的中國做明顯的區隔的時候，這個時候，假如說人類沒有進步到，或者是
理性到不用戰爭或者其他的層面去思考這件事情的時候，我覺得是很多臺灣獨立的人要去思考一件
事，就是你願不願意一戰。就是走到戰爭的這一步，走到武力衝突的這一步，你還支不支持民主，
支不支持獨立。很多人不願意想到這一點。
66 郭鴻陽：來美國，臺灣在美國有名，可能是正常的，因為畢竟是美國支持的，所以很多新聞都會
報臺灣的事情。但是如果到別的國家可能就不怎麼樣了。
67 林冠廷：當然在臺灣，自我民族的意識沒有那麼強烈。因為你都是在臺灣，大家都是臺灣人，你
不會去討論。但一來美國，當然這個話題被放大了。也不是跟別人比較。很多在大陸可能不會討
論，在臺灣不會討論的，在美國會討論。像對我來講，當然就是民族意識有變更強。
68 劉詩涵：站在另一個角度想，其實事情也沒有那麼straightforward。他們也有他們的立場，我們也
有我們的立場。因為剛開始一來的時候，我還蠻不喜歡人家把我跟中國人compare。因為我是臺灣
人，我有我自己的passport，我們有自己的constitution，然後我就試著跟我的其他朋友講這件事。可
是後來我就覺得，why so serious？我還是會跟我朋友說我是臺灣來的，然後我們是一個國家，讓他
們知道我們的立場。然後他們如果說臺灣是中國的一部分，我還是有點不高興。可是我不會這麼試
著去推廣。
69 在美國很多時候，在國際上面看到臺灣人被中國政府，或者被不懂事的中國人侮辱，你會覺得臺
灣人的意識會越來越強。
70 吳麗華：我跟中國朋友也比較不會講到政治，談到政治傷感情啊。所以通常不太會講，不太會碰
觸到這種話題。
71 吳麗華：我（的中國）朋友都很喜歡臺灣，所以也沒有不同意。我的朋友們他們也是，我覺得他
們也認為臺灣是國家，跟中國不一樣。我有一個朋友就是講說，臺灣很好，他覺得臺灣是應該獨
立，要早點獨立。他有一次在跟一個美國人講這件事情，然後被旁邊另一個美國人聽到，他就說我
從來都沒有聽過一個中國人會講這件事情，而且還這麼義正辭嚴。
72 劉詩涵：（在臺灣時）然後我就覺得，可能中國人跟我們有點不太一樣。可是出來以後，遇到很
多很好的朋友都是中國人，我覺得他們跟我們都是一樣的，都是華人，也說中國話。
73 林冠廷：其實我覺得我們有時候，那根本很多時候都是中國政府在搞鬼，跟臺灣政府他們兩家有
時候就故意這樣子弄。因為像有時候很多人，很多中國人來，在美國念書，認識，那時候在西雅圖
大家都認識，有的就認為臺灣就是臺灣，中國就是中國啊，沒有必要搞混。他們有時候也覺得有時
候中國政府很幼稚這樣子。
Interviewees Information
1. Demographic
# Pseudonym Sex Age City of Birth
Grandparents,
Mainlander or 
Islander
1 Tsai-chieh Yang 楊采潔 F 34 Changhua Both
2 Cheng-han Li 李承瀚 M 29 Taichung Both
3 Chun-chiao Cheng 鄭春嬌 F 24 Taichung Islander
4 Shu-fen Tsai 蔡淑芬 F 27 Taipei Islander
5 Po-jui Tseng 曾柏睿 M 34 Taipei Both
6 Hung-yang Kuo 郭鴻陽 M 25 Tainan Islander
7 Chia-hao Hsu 許家豪 M 31 Taipei Islander
8 Chun-hung Hsieh  謝俊宏 M 19 Taipei Both
9 Hsiu-ying Huang 黃秀英 F NK Changhua Islander
10 Li-hua Wu 吳麗華 F NK Taipei Islander
11 Kuan-ting Lin 林冠廷 M 21 Taichung Both
12 Shih-han Liu 劉詩涵 F 27 Taipei Islander
13 Chih-ming Chang 張志明 M 36 Taipei Islander
14 Wei-sheng Wang 王偉勝 M 30 Taichung Islander
15 Yu-lan Chen 陳玉蘭 F 27 Taichung Islander
Name: Both surnames and given names are pseudonyms.
Age: at time of interview
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2. Viewpoint: identity
# Pseudonym
Language 
of 
Interview
Self-
thinking 
Taiwanese
Self-
thinking 
Chinese
Keeping
“ROC”
1 Tsai-chieh Yang 楊采潔 English Yes Yes Yes
2 Cheng-han Li 李承瀚 English Yes No No
3 Chun-chiao Cheng 鄭春嬌 English Yes No Yes
4 Shu-fen Tsai 蔡淑芬 English Yes Yes No
5 Po-jui Tseng 曾柏睿 English Yes Yes Yes
6 Hung-yang Kuo 郭鴻陽 Chinese Yes Yes No
7 Chia-hao Hsu 許家豪 English Yes No No
8 Chun-hung Hsieh  謝俊宏 English Yes Yes Yes
9 Hsiu-ying Huang 黃秀英 Chinese Yes No Yes
10 Li-hua Wu 吳麗華 Chinese Yes Yes No
11 Kuan-ting Lin 林冠廷 Chinese Yes No Yes
12 Shih-han Liu 劉詩涵 Chinese Yes Yes Yes
13 Chih-ming Chang 張志明 Chinese Yes Yes No
14 Wei-sheng Wang 王偉勝 Chinese Yes No No
15 Yu-lan Chen 陳玉蘭 Chinese Yes No No
Language of interview: An interview that is marked as in English might include 
Chinese conversations and vice versa.
Self-think Chinese: All 15 interviewees were presented the question “do you think 
you are Chinese” in the English language.
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3. Viewpoint: political
# Pseudonym Party Preference
Wishing 
Independence 
or Unification
Expecting
Independence
or Unification
1 Tsai-chieh Yang 楊采潔 Blue Ambiguous Unclear
2 Cheng-han Li 李承瀚 Green Independence Unclear
3 Chun-chiao Cheng 鄭春嬌 Green Independence Unclear
4 Shu-fen Tsai 蔡淑芬 None Independence Independence
5 Po-jui Tseng 曾柏睿 Blue Unification Unification
6 Hung-yang Kuo 郭鴻陽 Blue Independence Independence
7 Chia-hao Lin 林家豪 Green Independence Unification
8 Chun-hung Hsieh  謝俊宏 Blue Independence Unclear
9 Hsiu-ying Huang 黃秀英 Blue Independence Unclear
10 Li-hua Wu 吳麗華 Green Independence Unclear
11 Kuan-ting Hsu 許冠廷 None Independence Unclear
12 Shih-han Liu 劉詩涵 Blue Independence Unification
13 Chih-ming Chang 張志明 None Independence Unclear
14 Wei-sheng Wang 王偉勝 Green Independence Unification
15 Yu-lan Chen 陳玉蘭 None Independence Unclear
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Appendix 1. Recruitment Script
Hi (Name of Potential Participant),
Thank you for your interest in my study about Taiwanese national identity.
I would like to invite you to do an interview with me. I want to ask some questions 
about being Taiwanese and your national identity. The interview will last 45 to 60 
minutes. It will be completely confidential.
If you agree to be interviewed, would you please reply to this email and provide a 
phone number? I will contact you further with a detailed plan of time and location. A 
small compensation of appreciation will be provided for your time.
Thank you very much!
Liu, Zhao
Department of Sociology
Indiana University, IUPUI
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Appendix 2. Flyers
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Appendix 3. Interview Guide
1. Eligibility
• Are you 18 years or older?
• Are you born in Taiwan?
• Are you students?
2. Family
• Please tell me about your family, like your mother and father, sister and brother.
• Where were you born?
• When were you born?
• Where is your sister/brother born and what are they doing?
• Where are your parents from and what are they doing? Where did your 
grandparents come from?
• Where is your ancestry?
3. National Identity
• Being from Taiwan, how do you see China?
• What does your sister/brother say about it?
• What is your parents’ idea?
• What is your grandparents’ idea?
• Are you 外省人 (mainlanders)?
4. Taiwan Politics
• What do you think President Ma Ying-Jeou?
• Are you pro-green or pro-blue?
• What do you think President Ma’s China-Friendly Policy?
5. Foreign Relation
• Once when a Chinese government official visited Taiwan, Taiwan was told not to 
hang its national flag. What do you think?
• Taiwanese National Flag was not hung in Olympics Games or United Nations. 
What do you think?
Do you think Taiwan should declare independence?
• How do you think Taiwan and China’s economic relation?
• What do you think the difference of 中國人 (zhong guo ren) and 華人 (hua ren)?
• What do you think Diaoyutai Island/Diaoyudao/Senkakus? Who does it belong to?
• Do you think Taiwan should cancel its name “Republic of China?”
• Is it often that your American friends mix you up with people from China?
• Coming to America, how does your national identity change?
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6. Taiwan Culture
• What role do you think Japanese culture play in Taiwan?
• What role do you think Chinese culture play in Taiwan.
• Do your grandparents have memory about Japanese rule?
• Do they think they are Japanese?
• Do you know Confucius Institute? What do you think of it?
• Do you think there should be a Taiwanese Institute like Confucius Institute?
7. History
• Where were your grandparents when the KMT government retreated from mainland 
China to Taiwan in the late 1940s?
• How did the 228 Incident affect your family?
• How did the White Terror Period affect your family?
8. Ending
• Anything else that you think is important for me to know?
• Do you think there are any questions that I should have asked but I didn’t?
• Please provide your comment about this interview.
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Appendix 4. Study Information Sheet
IRB STUDY [#1209009461, 09/10/2012]
INDIANA UNIVERSITY STUDY INFORMATION SHEET FOR
National Identity about Taiwanese Research Study
You are invited to participate in a research study of the meaning of Taiwanese from the 
perspective of Taiwanese students in the US.  You were selected as a possible subject 
because you are a Taiwanese student in the US. We ask that you read this form and ask 
any questions you may have before agreeing to be in the study. 
The study is being conducted by Zhao Liu of the Department of Sociology IUPUI. The 
sponsor of this study is his professor, Dr. Carrie Foote, in the Department of Sociology at 
IUPUI. 
STUDY PURPOSE: The purpose of this study is to understand what it means to be 
Taiwanese from the perspective of Taiwanese students in the US. This research is part of 
the master thesis for Zhao Liu’s MA degree in Sociology. 
PROCEDURES FOR THE STUDY: If you agree to be in the study, you will do the 
following things: First, Zhao, the student researcher, will conduct a recorded interview 
with you, lasting about 45 minutes to one hour. Then the interview will be transcribed 
and analyzed. A report will be produced from the findings.
CONFIDENTIALITY: I will make every effort to keep your personal information 
confidential by changing your name during the transcription of the recordings and by not 
recording your name in any other way. Your name will not be used in the final research 
report. The only other people that may inspect the research records include my professor 
Dr Foote, and staff at the Indiana University Institutional Review Board. But please know 
that your personal information will be removed from any note of the research such that it 
is impossible to identify that you even participated in this research.
PAYMENT: You will receive a small gift as my way of saying thank you and expressing 
the appreciation for your time and effort taken to help me complete this study.
CONTACTS FOR QUESTIONS OR PROBLEMS: For questions about the study, 
contact the researcher Zhao Liu at 317-658-2627. For questions about your rights as a 
research participant or to discuss concerns about the research or to obtain information Dr. 
Carrie Foote at 278-8454. You may also contact the IU Human Subjects Office at (317) 
278-3458 or (800) 696-2949.
VOLUNTARY NATURE OF STUDY: Taking part in this study is voluntary. You may 
choose not to take part or may leave the study at any time.
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